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ABSTRACT
Understanding the ways in which organizations fail is foundational to the organization
studies discipline. Organizational sociologists have outlined the various ways organizations and
organizational cultures can fail separately or simultaneously, temporarily or totally. Yet, little
effort has been directed toward proving that organizational culture is capable of surviving the
complete and total collapse of the organization from which it emerged. This work uncovers a
new way that organizations can fail that leaves their organizational culture intact. The author
considers employee interactions during the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy by reassembling the
cultural artifacts contained in a company email archive to demonstrate that organizational culture
is less rigid and more resilient and unpredictable than previously thought. By centering
organizationally situated interactions between employees at the meso-level, the author
demonstrates how extra-local institutional logics can generate consensus, cohesion, and
confusion during periods of organizational turmoil, when those logics are dynamically
reimagined as endogenous to the organization by employees with disparate personal histories
across distinct organizational positions, who embrace them, combine them, challenge them, and
adapt them to support their own aims.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
What led to the ’08 crisis? First, there’s the buildup of the U.S. bull-market
mentality. Now, I’m going to try to run through these quickly. It’s not just one
single thing. All these things taken together – I refer to it as the perfect storm. But
it starts with the government. They wanted everybody to be able to fulfill their
view of the American dream. We had low rates, easy access to credit. That led to
increased home values, household debt, people borrowed a record amount of
money, and as rates went down further, people refinanced, they used their homes
and the increased value in their homes as ATM accounts…
Lehman was not a bankrupt company. The information coming out now is
speaking to that. Did we try to do everything we possibly could? Yes. Did we fall
prey to other agendas? I'll leave it at that… The real success for the firm, the real
success for Lehman Brothers in my view, and the key differentiator, was our
culture.
Former Lehman Brothers CEO, Dick Fuld
Opening Statement to Marcum MicroCap
May 28th, 2015
On Monday, September 15th, 2008 Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. As the biggest
bankruptcy protection claim in history, Lehman Brothers’ surpassed the next largest filing by
over half a trillion dollars.1 The immediate aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy was marked by a
broad market downturn and the collapse of investor confidence.2 As the public searched for a
scapegoat, Lehman Brother’s executives found themselves mired in controversy. They were
called to Capitol Hill to account for recent multi-million dollar employee bonus payments made
only months before the company failed.3 Others condemned government inaction and a failure
1

Mamudi, Sam. 2008. “Lehman folds with record $613 billion in debt,” Market Watch, September 15.

2

Berenson, Alex. 2008. “Wall St.’s Turmoil Sends Stocks Reeling,” New York Times, September 15.
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Swaine, Jon. 2008. “Richard Fuld punched in face in Lehman Brothers gym,” The Daily Telegraph, October 7.

1

4

2

to properly regulate the banking industry following Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Firms connected
with Lehman were likewise unable to escape rising public enmity, as Lehman’s auditors became
the subject of lawsuits alleging financial malfeasance.5 The federal government moved quickly
to restore public confidence and stem the tide of bank failures after Lehman’s disintegration by
authorizing the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)6, a $700 billion public bailout of the
financial sector, which provoked populist protests, culminating in the Tea Party and Occupy
Wall Street movements on the political right and left, respectively.7 As the consequences of
Lehman’s failure rippled across the globe, most could only wonder, “What was going on at
Lehman Brothers?”
Countless Lehman Brothers postmortems have appeared in popular film and print media
since the bankruptcy. Some implicate the greed and narcissism of individual executives in the
firm’s failure8, while others condemn government regulators for failing to limit the worst of Wall
Street’s excesses.9 Still more argue that the collapse of Lehman Brothers was brought on by the
structural interdependencies of the financial sector itself.10 Few, however, have investigated the
role of culture in Lehman’s demise, which is all the more surprising given former CEO Dick
Fuld’s convictions that Lehman’s key differentiator was its culture. This reveals the extent to
4

McDonald, Lawrence and Patrick Robinson. 2009. A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the
Collapse of Lehman Brothers. New York: Random House.
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October 3.
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which our current understanding of organizational culture during periods of organizational
failure remains incomplete. Seeking to satisfy this need, this project examines the case of
Lehman Brothers to consider how an organizational culture that celebrates merit and extols the
talent and ability of its employees explains and accommodates for organizational failure. This
research analyzes a database of emails written by Lehman Brothers employees in the months
leading up to and immediately following the bankruptcy to interrogate the sense making
strategies used by those within the firm during this period. In doing so, this research contributes
to both the recently resurgent field of organizational culture and the nascent sociology of markets
by providing an example of how organizational culture can overcome organizational crisis and
survive despite the permanent and total failure of the organization from which it originally
emerged. The paper achieves a further contribution by illustrating how the meanings systems
associated with the free-market mentality can frustrate understandings of failure during periods
of organizational crisis.
Literature Review
Culture is a system under which beliefs, rules, and assumptions are organized in ways
that sometimes align, conflict, or are ambiguous and unexpected, but that enables people to do
things together by linking the meanings of their actions and interactions in such a way that they
can be read, interpreted, and understood by others (Martin 2002, Meyerson 1991, Mills 1988).
Importantly, “culture does not necessarily imply a uniformity of values,” but rather a common
frame of reference through which people “may array themselves differently with respect to an
issue, but whether positively or negatively, they are all oriented to it,” (Feldman 1991: 154).
Therefore, under this definition, organizational culture fails only when it ceases to meaningfully
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order an organization’s practices in such a way that members are able to orient themselves to an
event, issue, or change, irrespective of if that orientation entails acceptance, resistance, or
indifference. Though they often coincide, it is possible for organizational failure and cultural
failure to occur independently, such that an organization’s culture might fail while the
organization itself does not. Moreover, organizational failure does not require that an
organization cease to exist. An organization fails when it is unable to meet its officially stated
objectives (Meyer and Zucker 1989) or achieve a goal that is normally expected (Clarke and
Perrow 1996). Organizational failure is not necessarily permanent or total. Failure, as thus
defined, can be temporary, with the organization prevailing after some momentary crisis.
Similarly, when cultures fail they do so in discrete and unpredictable ways. Sometimes an
organization and its culture fail simultaneously. Other times an organization’s culture fails and is
replaced by a new emergent culture, as the organization overcomes some threat or crisis. On
other occasions an organizational culture will not fail entirely, but instead split into multiple
idiocultures that foreground certain aspects of the old culture while disregarding, replacing, or
altering others. Figure 1 catalogs the multiple ways organizations and organizational culture can
fail (or not) and offers illustrative examples of each type.
Previous scholarship documents the various ways organizational failure and the failure of
organizational culture can occur (or not) either separately or synchronously in different instances.
Traditional business school cases conceptualize culture as a means of organizational control.
Managers direct workplace culture more or less monolithically, manipulating it to overcome
organizational challenges while ensuring employee compliance with new or modified
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Figure 1. Organizational Failures and Organizational Cultural Outcomes
Temporary organizational
failure, followed by restructuring
and recovery
Cultural
failure

Organizational crisis during which
new beliefs and values emerge,
while old ones are abandoned

this is the province of traditional
business school cases that see
culture as an avenue to drive
change and overcome industry or
operational problems.
(see Kotter and Heskett 1992)
Crisis causes or reveals generative
Cultural
dissonance between groups and the
disintegration organization fractures into factions
into idiocultures differentiated by idiocultures, but
survives despite these divisions

Cultural
survival

Total organizational failure and
organization dissolution
Collapse of sensemaking;
Group disintegration;
Breakdown of people doing things
together
Complete cultural disintegration
Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993)
Discrete groups characterized by
distinct idiocultures compete for
organizational control; No single
group is able to overcome crisis on
its own

Existing culture splinters into
multiple idiocultures

Existing culture splinters as
organization collapses

Plainfield Tornado (Fine and
Hallett 2014)
Organizational crisis attributed to
“operator error” or “isolated
misconduct”;
Leaders blamed, fired, and
replaced; High risk of recurrence

Arthur Andersen Collapse
(Hallett 2003)

–

Challenger Launch Disaster
(Vaughan 1996)

organizational norms and policies. In these situations, the organization experiences a failure
during which old beliefs and values are abandoned as obsolete and new ones, which are more
suitable for making sense of and meeting the contingencies of the crisis, emerge to replace them.
A classic example of this appears in Kotter and Heskett’s (1992) case study of Nissan. In 1981,
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Nissan introduced the Nissan Stanza, their first front-wheel drive automobile. It was designed to
have broad international appeal and was expected to be the first Nissan model that would
compete directly with American and European manufacturers. After disappointing initial sales,
the Stanza was subsequently recalled due to suspension flaws that made it unsuitable for
American highways. Following this embarrassment, Nissan CEO Takashi Ishihara resigned and
was replaced by Yutaka Kume, who sought to unshackle engineers’ creativity from the inwardly
focused, regulation-obsessed autocratic culture that existed at Nissan. Kume introduced flexible
work schedules, eliminated company uniforms, and gave engineers final say over the design of
new models. Nissan’s engineers largely embraced this newly established independence and the
allure of work group autonomy attracted a younger generation of engineers to Nissan. The result
was a new culture of employee empowerment and youthful energy, which helped Nissan
overtake Honda in domestic automobile sales by the end of the decade.
Other scholars, however, take a less instrumental approach to culture and organizational
failure. Weick (1993) considers the deaths of thirteen backcountry firefighters during the Mann
Gulch Fire to provide an example of an organizational failure during which organizational
culture also failed and new norms and values did not emerge. Instead, the inability of the
firefighters to orient themselves to the unfolding crisis ended in a complete collapse of sense
making, role structure disintegration, and ultimately the demise of the group. Fine and Hallett
(2014) take up the case of the National Weather Service’s mishandling of the deadly Plainfield
Tornado to show how an organizational failure can engender, expose, or compound divisions
between small group cultures within an organization. The failure to provide advanced warning of
the devastating tornado became a point of differentiation between the National Weather
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Service’s Chicago and Flowerland offices. Flowerland, a new office created as a result of the
agency’s restructuring, developed an idioculture that emphasized collective accountability, while
the Chicago idioculture was grounded in the individual autonomy of its forecasters. The failure
of accounting giant Arthur Andersen reveals how distinct internal idiocultures compete for
legitimacy and organizational control (Hallett 2003). Hallett (2003) characterizes Arthur
Andersen’s cultural turmoil as a conflict between “Samurai” and “Merchant” group cultures.
While the Samurai culture was engrossed in fidelity to established accounting practices, the
Merchant culture was consumed with generating ever-greater revenue. Neither group proved
capable of withstanding the failure on its own. Some “merchants” broke with the “samurai” to
establish their own separate company and the remaining “merchants” pushed Arthur Andersen’s
“samurai” into riskier relationships with Enron and Worldcom. Vaughan (1996) uses the
Challenger Launch Disaster to outline a case in which organizational culture survives an
organizational failure. Following the explosion of the Space Shuttle, NASA blamed the incident
on the “amoral calculations” of the project’s managers and fired or reassigned those involved.
NASA’s data-obsessed procedural culture of production that normalized technical deviance and
incentivized calculated risk-taking, however, was allowed to endure unchanged. As a result,
Vaughan predicted a high likelihood that the tragedy would be repeated, which was eventually
borne out several years later when the Space Shuttle Columbia burst apart upon reentry.
Notwithstanding previous scholars’ robust and fastidious analyses of cultural and
organizational failures, little attention has been directed toward the ways in which organizational
culture might survive despite the total failure and dissolution of an organization. Filling out our
understanding of this final remaining category would allow us to complete the typology in the
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table above and augment the existing organization studies literature. While it is theoretically
possible for an organizational culture to persist in the absence of the organization from which it
emerged, demonstrating how exactly this comes about has proven to be an elusive contribution
to the literature. Culture is only discernible through its patterns of manifestation (Martin et. al.
2006). For the social scientist, studying culture is challenging enough when the organization can
be observed and data gathered in real time, but is made even more difficult when the original site
of these manifestations no longer exists. Patterns and configurations of organizational culture
become detectable when members interact to interpret their world (Martin et. al. 2006, Schein
1985, Schall 1983). Culture is enacted in interactions and, thus, revealed when people do things
together (Fine and Hallett 2014, Hallett 2003). “To really understand a culture and to ascertain
more completely the group’s values and overt behavior,” Schein (1985: 3) argues, “It is
imperative to delve into the underlying assumptions, which are typically unconscious, but which
actually determine how group members perceive, think, and feel.” These assumptions are
constantly evolving within a negotiated order in such a way that they are largely taken-forgranted, but also modified and adapted by members as patterns of interaction shift (Hallett and
Ventresca 2006). They are institutional in nature, bound up in logics that constrain organizational
life, but are themselves subject to interpretation and modification through the local interactions
that invest them with their distinct capacity to exert organizational pressure (Hallett and
Gougherty 2018, Hallett 2010, Hallett and Ventresca 2006).
Inhabiting Institutions & Logics in Interaction
Previous generations of organization studies scholars were attentive to the internal
tensions shaping organizational life (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Armed with the intervening
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advances in organizational theory, it is the task of contemporary researchers to correct the
discipline’s macro-evolutionary drift (Hallett 2010: 55). McPherson and Sauder (2013: 166)
suggest, “More work is needed to unpack how local actors mediate institutional demands and the
requirements of day-to-day organizational activity.” By returning to an emphasis on local
interactions and considering how the extra-local meanings systems of institutional logics are
transformed in the process through which they become endogenous to organizations, an
inhabited approach that is equally sensitive to institutional context and local pressures harkens
back to the discipline’s neglected foundation (Hallett 2010: 66). Paramount to this perspective is
the knowledge that local action is not simply pragmatic or unconscious (Haedicke 2012).
Institutional logics consist of the “assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning
to their social reality,” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 804). Yet, while these logics are based in
part on taken-for-granted assumptions, their interpretation and invocation requires people, who
themselves have distinct convictions and motivations, to propel them, by way of interaction,
through organizational settings (Everitt and Levinson 2016, McPherson and Sauder 2013,
Haedicke 2012). In this way, institutions “establish the conditions of possibility,” but only
acquire their force and meaning when instantiated by people in interaction (Hallett and Ventresca
2006: 227).
People in organizations use local cultures to translate and respond to institutional
pressures (Haedicke 2012). Dorado (2013) draws on small group contexts to confound the idea
of the institutional entrepreneur, arguing that institutional adaptations and innovation emerge
from small group cultures. Others apply this outlook to demonstrate how different groups
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promote their own permutations of institutional logics in order to legitimize competing
organizational forms (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007, Dobbin and Zorn 2005, Lounsbury 2002)
and to understand how prevailing logics can inform companies’ financial decision-making
processes (Zajac and Westphal 2004). An institutional logics perspective links individual agency
and cognition with the rule structures of institutional practice (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 101).
The legitimacy of prevailing institutions is preserved even when their logics are modified to meet
local needs or are deployed in unpredictable ways. Thus, the taken-for-granted assumptions of
institutional logics serve as the engines of institutional influence in organizations (McPherson
and Sauder 2013: 185). Organizations, in fact, are precisely “places where institutional logics
combine with local, embedded meanings to produce particular variations of local action,”
(Binder 2007: 551). This comes about as people, in interaction, embrace logics, combine logics,
challenge logics, and adapt them to meet their needs (Binder 2007: 568). As such, disagreements
are inevitable, especially during periods of crisis when the stakes are high. We should consider
how different groups within an organization and across all levels of its hierarchy might engage
the same logics differently in pursuit of their own, often opposing, interests. Crucially, we must
understand how these different groups enact a shared organizational culture even when adopting
and emphasizing certain elements of a particular logic while ignoring that logic’s other aspects,
as they go about reordering organizational life and working together, at times in concert and at
other times in conflict, to construct their social world.
The consequences of Lehman Brothers’ sudden and unexpected failure are not confined
simply to those immediately experienced by the people beleaguered by the company’s collapse,
nor even to just the global financial system. That which can be gleaned from the case of Lehman
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Brothers concerns every dimension of social life into which the free-market mentality permeates.
The multiple ways in which Lehman employees constructed ideas about talent, merit, and the
free market illuminate broader trends regarding how and when free market institutional logics,
and the assumptions they encompass, are deployed. While previous scholarship outlines the
relationship between organizations and organizational cultures when they fail together, either
permanently or partially, less scrutiny has been directed toward the ways organizational cultures
might survive the complete failure of the organizations from which they initially emerge.
Supplementing the literature in this way requires overcoming organizational sociology’s “macroevolutionary drift” and restoring emphasis on local interaction. This approach not only alerts
researchers to the connections between local interaction and extra-local meanings systems, but
also foregrounds the importance of organizational position and perspective in the interpretation
process. Refocusing attention in this way brings to the surface the many ways organizational
culture enables and constrains patterns of meaning making, while simultaneously being, itself,
transformed through the local interactions within which these patterns emerge, are interpreted,
and reenacted.
Methods
Explanations of financial crises offered by contemporary economic sociologists tend toward
neoinstitutional accounts, emphasizing behavioral conformity, imitation, and even consolidation
within the financial sector (Carruthers 2010, Pozner et. al. 2010), or “normal accidents”
perspectives, which foreground the complexity and connectivity of the global banking system
(Palmer and Maher 2010, Mezias 1994). Perrow (2010: 329) himself, however, posits a more
agentive view of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, contending that financial executives were
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complicit in a decades-long deregulation project while actively encouraging the acceleration of
short-run self-interest, the results of which constitute “knowing malfeasance.” Perrow does not
seem to be alone in this view, as the desire to discern guilt and condemn those responsible is
seductive. Some of the search terms presented below, for example, which the bankruptcy
examiner used to sort through Lehman Brothers emails, (see Figure 4; e.g. risk, punish, big
trouble) indicate an interest in uncovering potential financial malfeasance.
Given the inclination to assign blame, it is important to recall that not a single Lehman
Brothers executive was indicted as a result of the bankruptcy. In fact, following the better part of
a year spent reading through nearly four and a half million email exchanges without discovering
illegal activity, the bankruptcy examiner characterized management decision making as
exhibiting “serious but non-culpable errors of business judgment,” (Valukas 2010: 3). The
examiner’s team, and later Congress, interviewed 250 former Lehman employees without
unmasking a conspiracy. Lehman was not some malicious criminal enterprise. Accordingly, if
the employees of Lehman Brothers, including the firm’s leadership, were not the intentional
architects of the company’s demise, what were they doing as the walls began crumbling around
them? How did employees on the inside of Lehman Brothers make sense of the firm’s decline?
And importantly, how does an organizational culture pervaded by the free-market mentality and
wont to extol the talents of its employees explain and accommodate for organizational failure?
Data Analysis
In 2010, Richard Swedberg (2010: 104) asserted, “that there were a series of decisions in the fall
of 2008 that turned the credit crunch into a full-scale financial panic and that one of the most
important of these involved the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.” Swedberg (2010:83-84) calls
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the March 2010 bankruptcy examiner’s report, which was compiled using five million internal
company documents, “the most exhaustive investigation of Lehman’s affairs,” and suggests that
the pages of these documents may contain the insights necessary to discern how Lehman’s
leadership understood the unfolding crisis. This project examines a collection of nine hundred
and thirty-one company email exchanges made publicly available as appendices to the courtappointed bankruptcy examiner’s report. Though I use the terms emails and email exchanges
interchangeably throughout when describing the constituent components of the dataset, the
examiner’s report labels and presents each set of email exchanges as an email chain, even those
containing a single email. The email chains included below are reproduced as they appear in
court records, preserving abbreviations, errors, and formatting wherever possible. Any
corrections or clarifications necessary to ensure comprehension or make the exhibits more
accessible, such as when employees use stock ticker symbols in place of full company names,
are denoted with the use of brackets. The labels immediately following each email chain
correspond to unique evidentiary exhibit identification numbers assigned by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. While previous scholars (Hallett 2003,
Vaughan 1996) have utilized company documents, internal memoranda, and training materials to
analyze the consequences of corporate culture, this project is among the first to use email
archives to analyze the construction of shared meanings across an organizational culture.
This collection of 931 email chains is the result of an extended filtering process by the
bankruptcy examiner designed to identify internal communications most relevant to the
disposition of remaining assets following the bankruptcy as well as to uncover potential financial
malfeasance. This process required, what I call, a “branched bifurcation” selection regime
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similar to the statistical recursive partitioning approach to Big Data (Breiman et. al. 1984; see
Figure 2 for a simplified diagram of recursive partitioning). At the outset of the bankruptcy
Figure 2. Recursive Partitioning

proceedings the court-appointed examiner discovered three thousand terabytes of archived
employee emails, or approximately 350 billion pages of text, dating back to May 2006. This
mass of data was narrowed to include only those emails containing specific items of interest to
the examiner. The preliminary search used specific keywords in various combinations and
yielded 5.15 million emails, consisting of approximately thirty-four million pages of text. Initial
search terms are presented in Figure 3 and constitute what is best defined as a “descriptive” filter,
eliminating emails not relevant to the bank’s operations and management strategy.
The results of the first search were filtered further in a secondary round of treatment.
Contingent search terms are presented in Figure 4. This subsequent search returned 4,437,095
emails, consisting of some twenty-six million pages of text. The contingent search terms seem to
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Figure 3. Bankruptcy Examiner Initial Search Terms

Figure 3
Figure 4. Bankruptcy Examiner Contingent Search Terms

Contingent Search Terms

Bad Company

Big Trouble

Breach

Concern

Desperate

Disaster

Get Out Of

Just Between Us

Let’s Discuss
Perception Issue

Need Another
Punish

Anxious
Slippery Slope

Real Objective
Risk

Stupid

Too Late
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represent a more targeted and punctilious approach to the remaining email chains. These
secondary search terms appear to reveal the bankruptcy examiner’s interest in demonstrating
financial malfeasance or corporate fraud at Lehman Brothers. It would be inappropriate, however,
to cast this as a primary aim with any certainty, as this was never stated as a direct objective of
the bankruptcy examiner’s team. Furthermore, while bankruptcy examiners have in the past
uncovered executive negligence as well as flagrant malfeasance, with Enron being perhaps the
most prominent example11, the primary function of the examiner is to serve as a mediator
between creditors. In this capacity, it is important for the bankruptcy examiner, as chief legal
investigator, to maintain the appearance of impartiality. Yet, contingent search terms such as:
“risk, breach, and slippery slope,” do seem to, at least, suggest that the examiner was concerned
about the possibility of management wrongdoing.
Between April 7, 2009 and March 11, 2010 a team of eighty-one contract attorneys
reviewed each email and coded them according to the substantive topic area of each document.
The principal objective of this coding was to “code out” items devoid of any financial
irregularities, thereby selecting only those emails that had the potential to suggest employee
impropriety. It must be noted here that the presence of financial irregularities and allusions to
employee impropriety do not necessarily correlate to illegality, but rather divergence from the
firm’s publicly reported strategy and stated goals, which if undermined would adversely affect
creditors and/or shareholders. Associates at the firm of the lead examiner, Jenner & Block,
performed intercoder reliability checks throughout. Documents identified as potentially relevant
by the first level of coding were submitted to corporate finance consultant Duff & Phelps for
11

Associated Press. 2003. “Bankruptcy Examiner Finds Enron’s Top Leaders Neglectful,” New York Times,
November 25.
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more careful review and further coding. Duff & Phelps financial analysts separately coded the
content of emails for any possible implications on the liquidation of Lehman’s remaining assets
as well as the likelihood of and potential for corporate fraud. This stage of coding represents a
shift from the more “exploratory” coding of Jenner & Block to a “selective” coding distinguished
by more pragmatic considerations. Duff & Phelps’ proprietary coding strategy could rightly be
described as a “coding in” process, as email exchanges deemed to be material to the disposition
of Lehman’s assets against claims of creditors were included in the bankruptcy examiner’s report
and made public by the court. These 931 email communications, representing approximately five
thousand pages of transcribed text constitute the data considered below.
The lack of transparency during the two rounds of coding described above amounts to a
major limitation of the data. To date, the codes used to narrow the set of email exchanges from
over four million to the 931 that were published have not been disclosed, nor has there been any
indication that they will be. The codes used by Jenner & Block, which were meant to categorize
the email chains by the topic areas of their content, remain unknown. As such, we cannot say
how broad or focused these “topic areas” were. Moreover, while a small group of Jenner &
Block associates did perform intercoder reliability checks throughout the duration of coding, it is
unclear what criteria were used when applying codes in the first place. The examiner’s published
report references a high rate of intercoder reliability, but does not reveal an exact number. What
is more, we do not know how many associates were involved in reliability checks, nor how often
these checks took place. While the report states that eighty-one contract attorneys were involved
in the initial phase of coding, we know little about their professional backgrounds, qualifications,
or possible predispositions toward Lehman Brothers.
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With respect to the proprietary coding completed by Duff & Phelps, while the examiner’s
report outlines more clearly that the aim of this round of coding was the identification of
financial circumstances that could influence the resolution of Lehman’s outstanding debts, we,
again, do not know how codes were generated, the criteria used to determine code application, or
the identity and qualifications of those involved in the coding process. Importantly, though we
know that nearly four and a half million email communications were subject to the coding
regime, resulting in the 931 presented to the court, there is no indication of how many email
chains were submitted to Duff & Phelps for consideration. Therefore, while we know the starting
point and results of the coding process, all intermediary steps remain clouded in uncertainty. A
diagram of the cumulative treatment of the source data is presented in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Cumulative Source Data Treatment Diagram

One particularly striking characteristic of the Lehman email data is the unprecedented
level of access they grant to those ordinarily insulated from the social scientist’s gaze. Laura
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Nader (1972: 302) first made the case for “studying up,” while simultaneously drawing attention
to the challenges of doing so, namely that “the powerful… don’t want to be studied.” In his
retrospective on Nader’s contribution, Gusterson (1997: 115) notes that qualitative methodology
“does not travel well up the social structure.” Wall Street’s wealthy elite deploy their privilege to
erect barriers, both literal and symbolic, which set them apart from society and obstruct access to
and information about them. Mikecz (2012: 483) summarizes, “Elites are visible but not
necessarily accessible.” Elites do not constitute a homogenous group, however, as power and
privilege are not uniformly distributed even at the top (Domhoff 1990, 2018). As such, when
studying elites, researchers should be careful to examine how the power relationships among
elites influence how they construct meaning as they go about constructing the world (Declercq
and Ayala 2017). The different administrative levels within a bureaucratic organization like
Lehman Brothers only amplify the importance of respondents’ organizational position, as the
power to act on meanings is diffused broadly at all levels of an organization’s hierarchy (Hallett
2003, Martin 1992).
Recent studies (Khan and Jerolmack 2013, Khan 2011, Ho 2009) primarily address the
socialization of elites occupying a single social location, with little attention to how internal
status differences within an elite group manifest in the process of sense-making. We do know
that the email data considered below benefit from an expansive view of Lehman Brothers
employees. The bankruptcy examiner’s staff narrowed the set of email exchanges to those
ultimately included in the bankruptcy report without regard for correspondents’ position within
the firm, from the mailroom to the boardroom. The surnames of several company executives do
appear among the preliminary search terms (see Figure 3) and this reveals the examiner’s special
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interest in the activities of Lehman’s leadership. Yet, while special attention was given to the
emails of some, none of the original emails were excluded from consideration on the basis of job
title alone. Furthermore, the use of internal emails overcomes the challenge of disentangling the
company’s public position from the private views of Lehman personnel (Campbell 2002). Thus,
the data used in this study represent a combination of exceptional depth and breadth (Ragin and
Becker 1992), offering unparalleled access to 319 Lehman Brothers employees up and down the
firm’s hierarchy during a momentous two-year period in the company’s history. This makes
Lehman Brothers an exceptionally compelling case. Figure 6 presents a simplified outline of
Lehman’s organizational hierarchy along with a tabulation of the number of employees in each
Figure 6. Lehman’s Organizational Hierarchy Simplified

15 Members Selected from among
the Firm’s Managing Directors
Executive
(18 employees)

Committee

Middle Management
Managing Directors (123),
Executive Vice Presidents,
Directors (17)

Rank and File Employees
Senior Vice Presidents (48), Vice Presidents (43)
Assistant Vice Presidents (8), Senior Associates (11)
Associates (11), Analysts (15), Interns (3)
• 3 internal relationship management advisors outside the firm’s traditional hierarchy
• 19 employees could not be determined

job classification appearing within the data. Employees are arranged into three groups, Lehman’s
executive committee at the top, the firm’s rank-and-file employees at the bottom, and, as the
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name suggests, middle management between the two. The rationale for grouping the company’s
employees in this way rests on the fiercely hierarchical structure of the organization itself. The
fifteen-member executive committee was comprised of Managing Directors appointed to that
body by the firm’s Chief Executive Officer with the consent of Lehman’s Board of Directors.
The executive committee served as the site of strategic decision making and was ultimately
responsible for defining the firm’s goals and business plan. While it is unlikely that the
Managing Directors that constitute this simplified hierarchy’s middle tier would have considered
themselves “middle managers” in the conventional sense, I apply the label “middle
management” for descriptive convenience and use three criteria to distinguish them from those
above and below. First, those who occupy the middle level had P&L responsibility for some part
of the business or held business unit oversight if they presided over a non-revenue generating
division. Second, those in the middle tier enjoyed workflow autonomy, which is to say that they
were able to direct how the work they did, or supervised, got done. Finally, notwithstanding
these first two criteria, those situated in the middle of the hierarchy were not members of the
executive committee and so were excluded from the formal company-wide decision-making
processes that took place at the top and rippled downward through the firm. Employees that were
not executive committee members and did not meet both of the other criteria above are
considered junior employees among the company’s rank-and-file. As the criteria indicate, these
are mutually exclusive groups, such that no employee may be classified as a member of two
groups simultaneously, though, as we will see, people regularly move between groups as they are
promoted, demoted, or reassigned. All three of the groups were quite monolithic in terms of a
common consensus about their shared meanings and employees within each layer policed their
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own peer group in multiple ways. Importantly, these patterns of meaning making rarely appear
directly, but instead arise when the groups are forced to put their shared meanings into practice
and decide how something ought to be done. While the evidence of relative consensus differs
between the groups, just as the number of collective decisions confronting each group also
differs, the data reveal increasing intragroup homogeneity as the organizational crisis deepens.
Not only did the existence of strong group consensus along these hierarchical fault lines emerge
during data analysis for this project, the bankruptcy examiner recently confirmed in a 2019
interview that these same patterns of understanding likewise surfaced during the court’s original
investigation of the bankruptcy as well.12
In this project, I supplement the work of the bankruptcy examiner with original social
scientific treatments of the Lehman Brothers email dataset, introducing a coding scheme
sensitive to subjects’ perceptions (Carley 1993) and not just the financial consequences of
employee conduct. This project centers the locally situated interactions of organizational actors
in institutionally embedded relationships to examine how employees on the inside of Lehman
Brothers made sense of the firm’s decline in order to understand how an organizational culture
engrossed in extolling the acumen and expertise of its employees explained and accommodated
for the organization’s failure.
I began this ancillary coding stage by identifying the broad substantive themes within the
data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). The most promising of these themes was that of
“efficiency,” which both features prominently in the bankruptcy examiner’s account and is the
foremost result of an NVivo 12 stem frequency query when controlling for articles (i.e the, an) as
12

Deschamps, Jennifer. (Director). 2019. Inside Lehman Brothers. [Film]. Gravitas Pictures: A Red Arrow Studios
Company in association with KM Productions and Intuitive Pictures.
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well as all previously used search terms. These themes, especially “efficiency” and in particular
how decisions about what is or is not efficient were made, informed an iterative thematic coding
regime (Chambliss and Schutt 2012, Creswell 2007, 2003), under which I applied nonexclusive
categorical codes based on the content of each email (Charmaz 2017, Corbin and Strauss 1990).
I simultaneously organized the emails by date and tracked those involved as sender and
recipient(s) in each exchange in order to locate the data within the prevailing historical context as
well as the extra-local environment of the global banking industry (Burawoy 1998). I utilized
hierarchical coding when “nesting” codes better captured empirical nuance without
compromising the analytical reliability of established coding categories (Thomas 2006).
The bankruptcy examiner’s report opens by counseling, “There are many reasons
Lehman failed, and the responsibility is shared,” (Valukas 2010: 2). Still, with all of the many
reasons for Lehman’s failure and all of the duly shared responsibility, one particular facet
emerges repeatedly throughout the examiner’s account: market efficiency. The bankruptcy
examiner bemoans management’s “implementation of an aggressive countercyclical business
strategy,” deriding executives for eschewing the principles of efficiency (Valukas 2010: 45).
Even designating this strategy “countercyclical” suggests that the market has some natural
rhythm, which if ignored risks inducing inefficiency. True to his preamble, the bankruptcy
examiner seized upon opportunities to divvy up the shared responsibility for Lehman’s undoing.
In testimony before Congress he opined, “The SEC’s mission – clearly stated on its own website
– is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.” The SEC’s role was not to simply absorb and acquiesce to Lehman’s decisions; the
SEC’s role was to supervise and regulate to protect investors and the market,” (Government
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Publishing Office 111-124). The examiner continued later to explain, “I found no evidence to
suggest that Lehman withheld any information requested by any agency. But it is my conclusion
that the government simply acquiesced to the information it was given; it took no regulatory
action,” (Government Publishing Office 111-124). Ultimately, the examiner’s report concludes,
“while certain of Lehman’s risk decisions can be described in retrospect as poor judgment, they
were within the business judgment standard,” (Valukas 2010: 22). It is revealing that the
bankruptcy examiner seemed just as interested in whether or not Lehman’s business decisions
were efficient, as he was in whether or not they were legal. This insight provided a principal
point of departure from which to mobilize the existing data through new social scientific coding
protocol attentive to not only what is deemed efficient, but more importantly, who gets to decide
what is efficient as well as how these determinations are made in concert and conflict with others
across the organization.
Organizational Positionality: Same Person, Different Position, Different Priorities
Organizational culture and organizational structure are interconnected. They are reflectively
reconstituted through the constant interactions of those within organizations. That is, they are
mutually dependent and evolve in tandem, as people within an organization deploy cultural
understandings to legitimize both new and existing structural patterns, while organizational
structure influences which cultural understandings are deemed appropriate and available in the
given organizational setting. This gives rise to a view of organizations as ongoing and negotiated
processes rather than static, concrete entities. Studying organizations during periods of turmoil
when internal instability is likely to result in myriad instantiations of the organizational process
illuminates the relationship between organizational culture and organizational structure.
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People experience and identify the needs of an organization differently based on their
status and location within the organization, which I refer to as “organizational positionality.”
That is, organizational groups leverage available cultural resources differently based upon how
they are situated within the structure of the organization. This organizational positionality
influences which interpretive strategies are used to make sense of events, as organizational
structure shapes the very extent to which internal actors perceive events and, thus, affects the
meanings that organizational events have for them. Following an employee through different
positions across different status levels lays plain the way organizational positionality operates.
In the exchange that follows, Ken Umezaki, a managing director of Fixed Income
Business Strategy at the time, consults his middle management peers about how best to handle
third quarter incentive compensation penalties for those employees who failed to meet their
targets, noting that the Fixed Income Division as a whole was “over by $3.7 billion.” Umezaki
continues by suggesting that they simply enforce existing policy and after receiving
encouragement from his colleague, boasts that he “got $8 billion from the firm.” In other words,
he received approval from the executive committee to increase the size of the Fixed Income
Division balance sheet by $8 billion. Therefore, the Fixed Income Division was, in reality, nearly
$12 billion off its quarterly target before Umezaki got approval to inflate the balance sheet,
effectively shielding many Fixed Income employees from being penalized, at the expense of
drastically increasing the amount of risk borne by the firm. Umezaki’s priority here appears to be
advocating for Fixed Income Division employees and sheltering them from adverse
consequences, even while disregarding the risks imposed upon the company as a whole.
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Figure 7. Ken Umezaki as managing director of Fixed Income Business Strategy
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Umezaki’s attitude changes considerably after he is offered the position of Chief Risk Officer
and potentially a seat on the executive committee. In this interaction, nearly a year later,
Umezaki is more concerned with the “team” and “the firm” in its entirety than he previously
seemed. Rather than “fighting a good fight” for the employees of one particular division against
the interests of another, Umezaki wants to help Lehman get its “mojo” back. While a year prior
Umezaki could have been accused of being adversarial and surreptitious, with his elevation to
the executive committee imminent he is more deferential, even bordering on obsequious at times.
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Apart from the monumentally bad timing, as Lehman would go bankrupt only five days later, the
second email reveals a further piece of irony in the way Umezaki characterizes Lehman’s risk
appetite. Umezaki claims, “The history of ‘end arounds’ on risk decisions and process at the firm
level is a major concern for me,” and yet less than a year prior Umezaki was, himself, utilizing
“end arounds” to inflate the Fixed Income Division’s balance sheet in order to protect employee
bonuses. As Umezaki’s organizational positionality changes so too does his orientation to risk
and he acts in ways he perceives to be appropriate for each of his positions in the firm.
Figure 8. Ken Umezaki appointed as Chief Risk Officer
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Organizational Crisis: Enacting the Culture of Exceptionalism
While it is well documented that organizational failures can take place alongside cultural
collapse and disintegration (Fine and Hallett 2014, Weick 2010, Hallett 2003, Weick 1993),
failures can also yield a unifying effect, whereby organizational constituents rally behind a single
organizational culture when confronted with an external threat. Yet, how this single culture is
interpreted by discrete groups within the organization, the ways they modify existing meanings
to meet their needs, and, importantly, how they enact them are all informed and dependent upon
their relationship to various organizational structures, that is: their organizational positionality.
Rather than delivering the organization from crisis, this can lead to internal disagreements about

29
which courses of action are appropriate (e.g. efficient) or how things “ought to be done,” as the
very organizational structures that color decision making are recast by competing organizational
narratives. In this case, separate internal groups use the same cultural resources and language in
the service of different ends, creating confusion about organizational priorities and compounding
the existing crisis. That is, various intra-organizational groups can all lay claim to the same
organizational culture, but do so in order to justify competing courses of action. Such was the
case with Lehman Brothers.
The scholarly appraisals of organizational crises discussed above, such as the
revitalization of Nissan (Kotter and Heskett 1992), the Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993), the
Plainfield Tornado (Fine and Hallett 2014), and the failure of Arthur Andersen (Hallett 2003),
illustrate how organizational culture can change, fragment into multiple idiocultures, or collapse
entirely during and in the aftermath of a crisis, spawning conflicting accounts of the crisis as well
as rival opinions about who should address it. This was not the case with Lehman, however.
Lehman Brothers’ culture did not disintegrate during the firm’s downfall. Unlike the
organizational crises previously studied, there is scant evidence that Lehman splintered into
warring factions, each guided by a distinct but familiar idioculture hewn from the formerly
uniform norms and customs of the broader firm. By contrast, Lehman collapsed inward on itself,
unified by the same organizational culture and united around a single organizational mythology.
Lehman’s mythology was a familiar one, especially to those on Wall Street, as it was no
different than the universally embraced tenet around which the whole industry was, itself,
organized: meritocracy. At its core, Lehman’s organizational culture, its corporate mythology,
was characterized by the belief that there was something exceptional about Lehman Brothers and
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the people who worked there and, furthermore, that this quality was deserved, having been
earned as a result of talent and ability. Those at Lehman Brothers often touted the firm’s history
and previous accomplishments as well as their own personal successes in order to account for
how such exceptional merit became and remained warranted.
Previous research demonstrates how market logics came to dominate financial thinking
and reshape the American corporation (Fligstein and Shin 2007, Fligstein 1990, Roy 1997).
Tracing the changing contours of the American economy from the early nineteen-eighties
onward, Davis (2009: 7) extends this examination into other social settings across all facets of
everyday life, including employment and the labor market, illustrating how the “disruptions that
accompany rapid market expansion provoke changed ways of thinking about social relations.”
Recent scholarship shows how talent is socially constructed and institutionalized in ways that
favor some traits over others, allowing elite groups to extract structural advantages that
perpetuate their unearned privilege (Mijs 2020). Assumptions about the moral deservingness of
those to whom talent is attributed have themselves become an institutional force that is mediated
through the day-to-day interactions of formal organizations like Lehman Brothers.
Though Lehman employees shared the same convictions concerning talent, which served
as the firm’s cultural cornerstone, the way that employees modified these meanings and, perhaps
more importantly, how groups of employees engaged and enacted these meanings in practice
were different for various internal segments of the company. Lehman was an echo chamber
within which a giant game of “telephone” was underway. Nowhere did the “wires get crossed”
more than between the hierarchical levels of the organizational chart. The executive committee,
middle managers, and junior rank and file repeated the same message using the specialized
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financial vocabulary that indicated mastery of a common manufactured and complex
professional expertise, but the ends to which this effort was directed were quite different for each
group. For example, what “efficiency” meant and what was considered “efficient” by the three
contingents were informed by each group’s relationship to the history of the firm’s cultural
narrative. Several of those on the executive committee had been Lehman employees since before
the firm broke away from American Express in 1994. Even more were employed by the time the
firm weathered the 1998 Russian financial crisis. In contrast, few middle managers and almost
none of the rank and file had been involved in Lehman’s past trials and triumphs. A brief
timeline of the relevant history of Lehman Brothers is presented in Figure 9. The organizational
structure of professional networks and personal employment histories, then, both enabled and
constrained the collective memories of each hierarchical group throughout the period of crisis.
Consequently, interpretations of the unfolding crisis by each group were read through the shared
knowledge and experiences to which they had access.
Lehman’s collapse did not cause its organizational culture to disintegrate. If anything, the
crisis led to employees clinging even more closely to Lehman’s existing organizational identity,
reasserting the beliefs, rules, and norms that they perceived to be underpinning the whole
endeavor. The tight unity that this produced brought with it new tensions, however, as conflicts
and confusion emerged concerning how to respond to organizational challenges even though the
various layers of the organization’s hierarchy shared a common explanation of the crisis.
Organizational groups leverage available cultural resources differently based upon how they are
situated within the structure of the organization, but they also combine these with modified and
adapted cultural strategies drawn from existing repertoires accumulated across diverse
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Figure 9. Lehman Brothers Timeline of Recent History
1994 – June 1st

Lehman Brothers becomes independent of American Express

$18 / share

1997-1998

Lehman weathers the Russian Financial Crisis and the failure
of Long Term Capital Management

$44 / share

2002

Lehman rebounds following dot-com bubble and 9/11 attacks

$53 / share

2006

Lehman is originating almost $50 billion in subprime
mortgage loans per month

$78 / share

2007 – February 2nd

Lehman Brothers’ stock reaches all-time high

$86 / share

2007

By the end of the year, Lehman is the largest single holder of
mortgage-backed securities

$65 / share

2008 – January 29th

Lehman announces increased dividends and plans to
repurchase as many as 100 million shares of stock

$63 / share

2008 – March 16th

JPMorgan Chase acquires failed investment bank Bear Stearns
in a deal underwritten by the Federal Reserve

$32 / share

2008 – March 18th

Lehman reports better than expected first quarter earnings,
while other banks are scrambling after Bear Stearns’ collapse

$46 / share

2008 – March 28th

CEO Dick Fuld contacts Warren Buffett about investing in
Lehman

$38 / share

2008 – June 9th

Lehman reports a massive $2.8 billion second quarter loss, the
first quarterly loss in the firm’s history

$29 / share

2008 – July 17th

Moody’s lowers Lehman’s credit rating

$19 / share

2008 – September 10th

Lehman announces a $3.9 billion quarterly loss

2008 – September 15th

Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection

$4 / share

organizational histories and personal experiences, especially those perceived to have been
successful in some earlier context (Dorado 2013, Hallett 2003). As a consequence, shared
cultural resources often shape organizational life in inconsistent and unexpected ways when
imported from one context and reinterpreted through interaction with one’s peers in another
(Haedicke 2012). Previous scholarship documents how different internal groups develop and
promote competing cultural explanations to legitimize different organizational forms (Marquis
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and Lounsbury 2007, Dobbin and Zorn 2005, Lounsbury 2002). This project endeavors to reveal
how different groups at Lehman Brothers adhered to a shared culture while plying this common
frame of reference to advance opposing organizational priorities in order to demonstrate how it is
possible for organizational culture to survive the complete collapse of the organization from
which it emerged.
When institutional logics are invoked to legitimize organizational forms and behaviors,
they are indelibly altered in the process of these interactions (Owen-Smith 2011, Hallett 2010).
Logics, as well as the organizational practices they inform and by which they are composed, are,
thus, greater than the sum of their constituent parts (Hallett 2003). As people move through
organizations by entering and exiting, being promoted, or reassigned their organizational
positionality necessarily changes. They learn, modify, and adapt new interpretive strategies as a
result of their movement through organizations, which they retain and continue to adapt in
concert with others to meet the new contingencies posed by different organizational settings.
They find new uses for existing institutional logics and refashion these logics in novel and
unexpected ways when they set about doing things together. Thus, the interpretive strategies
used to make sense of events are themselves conditioned by organizationally situated interactions
and the meanings that actions have for people where and when they occur. As this suggests,
Lehman’s executives, middle managers, and the junior rank and file leveraged a shared cultural
orientation to promote different organizational priorities based on how they were situated within
Lehman Brothers as the crisis unfolded. We will consider each group in turn.

CHAPTER TWO
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The position of those on the executive committee was that Lehman’s “counter-cyclical” strategy
was intentional and that the situation was well under control. They explained as much to the
Board of Directors in March 2007. Minutes from that meeting disclose that members of the
executive committee were under no illusion about the state of the market, characterizing the
situation as a “distressed environment.” They even anticipated a “fallout” in the housing market,
which would cause some firms to fail, leading to reduced competition in the industry. However,
the executive committee fully expected these obstacles to yield opportunities for growth just as
they had during the 1998 Russian financial crisis. The message was clear. Present troubles
provided potential opportunities for those unafraid of pursuing them. Lehman had a history of
exploiting such opportunities, catapulting itself into position as the fourth largest investment
bank on Wall Street behind the strength of its spectacular successes in the late 1990s and early
2000s. This time would be no different.
The minutes of the January 2008 Board of Directors meeting echo these sentiments. The
official record of that meeting opens with the pronouncement, emblazoned in bold, that “the
current environment presents a unique long-term growth opportunity for the Firm.” There can be
little doubt that Lehman executives thought their current situation akin to the previous
opportunities they had leveraged to “improve our competitive position” and “generate superior
returns.” The summary of this meeting even includes a section describing “The Firm’s
34
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Performance During Last Downturn.” This section recounts the financial achievements and
industry accolades Lehman accumulated during that period and attributes them to management’s
“counter-cyclical growth strategy.”
Figure 10. March ’07 Board of Directors Meeting Notes
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These reports to Lehman’s Board of Directors make it clear that the executive committee
viewed the financial market’s instability as an opportunity and aimed to seize on it. Lest the
Board confuse Lehman’s current circumstances with coincidence, these meetings served to
clarify for them the correct message. Lehman’s counter-cyclical measures were calculated and
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deliberate. The strategy had worked before. And the executive committee both understood the
ongoing market turmoil and had command of the situation. Moreover, references in both
meetings to “high quality personnel” and “investing in talent” betray the sense that Lehman, and
its employees, had earned its expanded business franchise by identifying growth opportunities
too often overlooked by competitors. The Firm’s success was not a matter of happenstance, but
due to the talent and tenacity of its employees, who stood undaunted at the call to do it again.
Figure 11. January ’08 Board of Directors Meeting Notes
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The situation changed little following the coerced sale of Lehman’s competitor, Bear
Stearns, to JPMorgan Chase. Following major losses and a credit rating downgrade in the fourth
quarter of 2007, Bear Stearns found itself in immediate need of liquidity and in March 2008
turned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for help. The Federal Reserve agreed to
purchase $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ toxic assets on the condition that Bear consent to be
purchased by JPMorgan Chase for $2 dollars per share, representing a discount of over 90
percent from what its market value had been just two days before. The price was later raised to
$10 per share, but this was still well below even one percent of what the company’s value had
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been only a year earlier. On March 16th, 2008, JPMorgan announced its acquisition of Bear
Stearns in what many characterized as a “sweetheart deal” arranged by Secretary of the Treasury,
Hank Paulson, and underwritten by the Federal Reserve. This shock to the financial system did
little to shake the resolve of Lehman’s executives, however. After all, Bear Stearns was not the
storied Lehman Brothers. Roger Nagioff, Lehman’s short-lived co-Chief Operating Officer, and
his team made this outlook abundantly clear as he prepared to present before his peers on the
executive committee. The spirit of Nagioff’s presentation was inescapable. Competitor
investment banks were racked with instability at the top, with Bear Stearns even being helmed by
an “absentee CEO pothead,” whereas Lehman’s leadership was calculating and steadfast against
the ebbs and flows of an uncertain financial market.
Figure 12. Nagioff’s Presentation Prep
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Nagioff was not alone in his view of Lehman’s leadership constituting a bulwark against
foreboding tides. Without exception, his colleagues on the executive committee considered
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themselves a remarkable team capable of traversing any crisis, not the least among them being
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Dick Fuld.
In the wake of Bear’s failure and government-facilitated sale, Fuld contacted Warren
Buffett on March 28th, encouraging him to invest in Lehman Brothers. Fuld hoped that an
investment by the world’s most well known investor would improve the market’s perception of
Lehman and serve to further separate it from the beleaguered reputation of Bear Stearns. To Fuld,
Buffett and Lehman Brothers were the perfect pairing. Both had consistently defied the odds and
found value where others were afraid to venture. Buffet’s own philosophy of “be fearful when
others are greedy and get greedy when others are fearful” paralleled Lehman’s “counter-cyclical
strategy.” A public declaration of confidence from Warren Buffett would go a long way toward
helping Lehman Brothers replicate its past successes. On the day of their conversation, Fuld sent
a follow-up letter by courier that offered the assurance, “Our firm is poised to return to greatness,
and many of Bear’s clients are coming our way.” Fuld ends with a resounding endorsement of
Lehman’s executive committee, concluding the letter:
In summary, let me again thank you for agreeing to meet with us. I believe that
you’ve been presented with a unique investment opportunity, and one that is sure
to be successful. Your hallmark is to invest in top-notch management teams, and I
humbly submit that we’ve demonstrated that we can navigate difficult waters.
Fuld thought he was making Buffett an offer that he could not possibly refuse. Lehman’s
management team was simply too good for anyone, including Buffett, to question. After all,
Lehman’s executives had successfully negotiated multiple tumultuous markets in the past. So
confident was Fuld, in fact, that he directed his administrative staff to draft a detailed
announcement of Lehman’s new partnership with Warren Buffett the day before their meeting
even took place.
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Fuld’s “Dear Colleague” letter refines the messages previously delivered to the Board of
Directors, defending the company’s “counter-cyclical” strategy and declaring at the outset that
Lehman “is well positioned to deliver industry-leading growth and profitability across all parts of
the market cycle.” Fuld acknowledges the fragile condition of the market, stipulating that it is, in
part, driven by “often inaccurate market rumors,” before trumpeting Buffett’s pending
investment as “an enormous tribute” to Lehman’s strength and growth. The announcement,
written the day before Fuld would speak with Buffett, continues, “the world’s most respected
investor, has decided to invest $3.5 billion in our Firm.” Unfortunately, Fuld’s decision to have
such a letter drafted was premature, as the three and a half billion-dollar investment from Warren
Buffett never materialized. However, the letter itself is telling, as the remainder of the draft
resonates the very same assertiveness and self-assurance vocalized by other executives at
Lehman Brothers.
Fuld’s vague description of how the anticipated capital from Buffett will be used does not
indicate any intention of altering the firm’s investment strategy whatsoever. The problem is
simply not Lehman Brothers, but the “confidence of investors.” Therefore, leadership need not
change tack. All that is required of them is to signal the existing strength of the firm. One method
of accomplishing this is for the executive committee to, as the saying goes, put their money
where their mouth is. Subject to the committee’s approval, Fuld promises, “our entire Executive
Committee has also committed to receiving its 2008 incentive compensation in this same form.”
Of course, the other way Fuld seeks to signal the Firm’s existing strength is by associating
Lehman with Warren Buffett and distancing it from Bear Stearns and other failed investment
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banks of that ilk. Citing Buffett’s record of success, Fuld plainly and unabashedly places Lehman
in the esteemed company of Coca Cola and GEICO.
It may be tempting to dismiss Fuld’s unwavering confidence in his firm as bluster for the
benefit of an external audience or a relatively withdrawn Board of Directors. Yet, this same rosy
messaging was being communicated down to middle management and the rank and file
employees below them. Moreover, the other members of the executive committee shared Fuld’s
confidence that the company’s employees were fully capable of repeating Lehman’s past
accomplishments.
Figure 13. The “Dear Colleague” Letter
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When confronted with questions about the possibility of Lehman being downgraded by
credit rating agencies as well as the effects of such an event, newly minted Chief Financial
Officer, Ian Lowitt’s, response could be fittingly described as indifferent. Though Lowitt is not

43
entirely dismissive, as he does furnish an answer in the exchange below, he appears altogether
unconcerned that a downgrade “will affect lines and willingness of counterparties” to lend to
Lehman Brothers, concluding, “We have operated at BBB+ before.”
Credit rating agencies evaluate corporate debt using a scale ranging from AAA to D,
which indicates default. At the time of the above exchange, most of Lehman Brothers’ debt was
rated as A1 (A+), with some debt instruments even rising to the Aa3 (AA-) level, both of which
indicate highly rated credit. A corporation’s credit worthiness, as illustrated by its rating, is
important not only because it influences the interest rate that the company will pay when it issues
bonds, but also because it generally governs the amount of collateral property that lenders will
demand the company pledge in order to get and keep a loan. To illustrate, if Lehman’s credit
rating fell one rung from A1 (A+) to A2 (A-), Lowitt reports the firm would be forced to post an
additional $700 million of collateral to secure existing lines of credit. Less than two weeks after
this exchange, Lehman Brothers was, indeed, downgraded.
Figure 14. “We have operated at BBB+ before”
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Lowitt’s casual response would be startling, were it not so precisely aligned with what
others on the executive committee were saying. Lehman had spurned Wall Street’s conventional
wisdom before to great avail, doubling-down on positions whose value seemed to be in free fall.
Lehman’s hallmark, in fact, was its “counter-cyclical” strategy. When Lehman’s credit rating
was in jeopardy of a manifold downgrade during the one-two-punch of 1998’s Russian financial
crisis followed by the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, Lehman ended
the year with stable, if not slightly increased, revenue and the next year their stock price doubled.
Sharply declining crude oil prices and economic instability in Southeast Asia during 1997 had
depleted Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. In the midst of growing civil unrest internally, the
Russian government devalued the ruble and defaulted on its debt in August 1998. On Wall Street,
rumors abounded about which firms had the greatest exposure to the, now worthless, Russian
debt. As whispers circulated, some wondered aloud whether the Russian financial crisis would
prove the largely untested Lehman Brothers’ ruin. In fact, Lehman did very little business in
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Russia because CEO Dick Fuld considered the whole country to be “the world’s biggest
[expletive] crime syndicate.” On the other hand, Long-Term Capital Management relied on
“emerging market” debt, in particular Russian bonds, as the backbone of their convergence
arbitrage strategy. LTCM had been founded by Nobel Prize-winning economists Robert Merton
and Myron Scholes and counted nearly every Wall Street bank an investor, except Lehman
Brothers. Within one month of Russia’s default, the value of LTCM was cut in half and investors
began heading for the exits, as Wall Street reeled. Not only was Lehman Brothers unscathed,
they seized on their good fortune to buy over one billion dollars of call options on 10-year US
Treasuries, which they eventually sold for a profit many times over. On conference calls at the
time, Fuld heralded employees’ ingenuity and urged them to “bleed Lehman green.” The
executive committee’s commitment to a “counter-cyclical” strategy and its faith in the elite talent
and tenacity of employees were immutable. So much so, in fact, that after barely one month in
his new role, CFO Ian Lowitt had adapted and honed the talking points for his new position. So
what if Lehman gets downgraded? They had operated under worse conditions before.
Lowitt’s decision to reference a far worse credit rating than the A2 (A-) grade originally
mentioned in the query is significant, as it is evocative of the executive committee’s mood with
respect to internal trepidation. Felder is simply inquiring about the not implausible possibility of
a credit downgrade and the consequences that will accompany being knocked down one rung. He
receives an answer from Lowitt along with the indirect reproof that Lehman has and, it is
insinuated, would manage to survive being downgraded a full three levels to BBB+, which is
only slightly above “junk bond” status. Lowitt’s tone communicates the executive committee’s
position that it will not permit disquiet among staff, especially from one who should know better.
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Felder, who will feature considerably later on, was a fourteen-year veteran of Lehman Brothers,
having endured all of the company’s recent trials and achieving a position as a Managing
Director of Credit Strategy for Global Fixed Income. Felder was not just another middle manager.
He was senior management in his own right. He had been through the wars and knew all about
Lehman’s penchant for bucking market trends. Now, to the dismay of the new CFO, he demurred.
The executive committee’s exacting standard of adherence to the well-established beliefs
and practices they credited with the firm’s success was not reserved solely for middle
management, nor even for more senior personnel like Felder. Within their own ranks as well,
those on the executive committee demanded allegiance to the view that Lehman was exceptional.
And they held one another accountable for the strength of their convictions that Lehman Brothers
stood alone in its mastery of the financial markets, as in the exchange that follows.
Doubts and Rejoinder: No Blinking
In the late summer of 2007, Lowitt had yet to be made CFO and was serving as the co-Chief
Administrative Officer for Finance. Filling the role of Chief Financial Officer was Chris
O’Meara, who, in the wake of the nascent crisis in the subprime mortgage market, circulated a
Wall Street Journal article that drew into question the wisdom of Lehman’s $22 billion
acquisition of Archstone-Smith, an apartment building investment and management company.
The recipients of O’Meara’s email were a veritable who’s who of financial decision makers at
Lehman, including the future CFO from the foregoing discussion, Ian Lowitt, who began his
rapid ascent into increasingly senior roles in 2006 after joining Lehman Brothers as a director in
1994. Appearing alongside him on the recipient list are Ed Grieb, Lehman’s Corporate Financial
Controller since 1991; Treasurer Paolo Tonucci, a twelve-year company veteran; the cat-of-nine-
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lives Dave Goldfarb, who had survived successive demotions from the positions of Chief
Financial Officer and then Chief Administrative Officer, but somehow managed to keep his
place on the executive committee in the invented and largely ceremonial role of Global Director
of Strategic Partnerships; and the email’s eventual respondent Gerry Reilly, the longtime Global
Product Portfolio Controller. All of whom, in fact, did “bleed Lehman green.”
O’Meara’s email belies the typical confidence characteristic of those on the executive
committee. This was certainly not the first time Lehman had been the subject of negative press,
but it clearly weighed on O’Meara enough to share it. The CFO’s late-night forwarding of such a
critical article suggests that he was beginning to waver. Perhaps the firm’s aggressive strategy
was finally keeping him up at night. Whatever the case, his email accommodates the possibility
that “Lehman may be better off paying a $1.5 billion break-up fee” to back out of the Archstone
deal, which would have been unfathomable to his peers on the executive committee. Lehman did
not just give money away for nothing. Years earlier in 1998 when Wall Street’s most prominent
CEOs organized a privately funded multibillion-dollar bailout of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management in order to avert a collapse of the equities market, Dick Fuld refused to “put
in any goddamned money” and Lehman declined to assist with the bailout. Handouts, in any
form, were not something Lehman did. It would succeed or fail on the merits of its employees,
not compensatory payments enabling it to skirt the mistakes of others. As such, the source of
O’Meara’s apprehension constitutes a far worse transgression.
Before summarizing the article’s position, O’Meara calls attention to its reference “to a
Citi real estate investment trust analyst.” The suggestion, however implicit or indirect, that
Citigroup might have discovered something overlooked by Lehman or, worse yet, that the
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possibility exists for a Citigroup analyst’s talents to equal those found within Lehman Brothers
was simply inexcusable. In the early morning hours not long after sending the email, O’Meara
receives the two-word reply, “No blinking.”
Figure 15. “No blinking”
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There was no place for second-guessing at Lehman Brothers, much less among the
members of the executive committee. Ultimately, Lehman did finalize the deal to acquire
Archstone on October 5, 2007, but O’Meara did not remain on the executive committee long
enough to see it. Before the end of the summer he was quietly removed from the committee,
demoted to Chief Risk Officer, and replaced by Lehman investment banking dynamo, Erin
Callan.
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The executive committee was firm in its commitment to the “counter-cyclical” strategy
that brought the bank to prominence and resolute in its belief that it had the brightest minds on
Wall Street at its disposal. Among them, Lehman’s leaders were convinced, was Erin Callan.
When asked why he had hired an internal candidate without a background in accounting to serve
as Chief Financial Officer, Dick Fuld told reports, “Lehman Brothers’ success depends in large
part on leveraging our best people’s strengths and experiences,” (White 2007). Frankly, Callan’s
pedigree rivaled any of her peers’ on the executive committee. The Harvard graduate had studied
tax law at NYU and quickly gained a reputation as a rising star after joining the firm in 1995.
This most recent promotion placed the 41-year-old among the top three women on Wall Street.
She was the embodiment of Lehman’s meritocracy.
Einhorn’s Critique and Callan’s Counter
During her first two quarters in the role, Lehman reported sizable profits at a time when its
competitors were losing money hand over fist. Despite these early successes, many on Wall
Street were beginning to wonder how Lehman had seemingly plunged headlong into the crisis,
yet remained unscathed. Internally, the cracks were already apparent, as Lehman prepared to
report a nearly $3 billion loss in the second quarter of 2008. Even so, these losses were still not
enough to unnerve the members of the executive committee. After all, some interim losses are
not entirely unexpected when undertaking a counter-cyclical strategy. Still, as Lehman’s stock
price continued to decline, the company’s executives became more and more convinced that
someone wasn’t playing fairly. Eventually, their sights settled squarely on upstart, activist
investor David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital. To this point, Einhorn was a one-hit-wonder after
making hay by short selling Allied Capital well in advance of the public revelation that Allied
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was essentially worthless. Now, he was making the rounds on television and at industry
conferences, telling anyone willing to listen that Lehman was next. Callan was tasked with
bringing this cheat to heel and on Friday, May 16 she called Einhorn after his latest disparaging
remarks.
Callan, like the rest of Lehman’s executive committee, thought Einhorn was attempting
to game the system. Not only did Einhorn have the gall to doubt Lehman’s management
practices, he did so openly and in front of the media no less. At the time of their phone call,
Lehman was still somewhat of a Wall Street darling, having so far avoided the massive losses
suffered by many of its peers, at least publicly. Yet, its stock price remained in decline, keeping
lockstep with other financial sector stocks as the whole industry traded lower. Einhorn had been
short selling Lehman shares since at least July 2007, helping depress prices, and his considerable
short position had already produced a decent return. Now, apparently unsatisfied with his present
gains, he was vocally deriding Lehman Brothers. Einhorn stood to benefit mightily if Lehman’s
stock price continued its slide, and his public criticisms seemed to make this eventuality all the
more likely. Members of Lehman’s executive committee blamed Einhorn for their slumping
stock price and the firm’s deteriorating financial condition.
Callan considered it her responsibility to convince Einhorn to refrain from casting further
aspersions. What’s more, as Wall Street’s rising star and by this time the face of the firm, she
had come to believe that she commanded sufficient influence to accomplish this. In the email
exchange that follows, Callan expresses a desire to engage Einhorn in an open and honest
dialogue to see if she can get him “more comfortable with Lehman Brothers.” She subsequently
explains, “there has been good reason to trust that my counterparts were acting fairly.” Sadly, she
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announces, “I come away from our conversation Friday and this e-mail below feeling you have
been very disingenuous.” Callan claims to have contacted Einhorn in good faith, extending to
him the benefit of the doubt, only to discover that he plans to discuss their conversation publicly
and once more criticize Lehman Brothers in clear violation of her trust. She feels set up and is
certain that Einhorn will “now cherry pick what you like out of the conversation to suit your
thesis.” To Callan, Einhorn’s actions constitute a bait-and-switch. “As someone new in her seat”
just learning how to fill the role of CFO, she worries she has fallen prey to Einhorn’s duplicity.
Following this revelation, she no longer deigns to indulge Einhorn, stating “it does not seem
prudent on my part to engage in any further conversations with you going forward.” She has her
staff follow up on Einhorn’s open questions then cuts off communication.
Figure 16. David@GreenlightCapital.com to Erin Callan
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Whether or not Einhorn acted disingenuously, as Callan claims, is up for debate, though
he certainly did not think he had (see Appendix A for his reply). Einhorn’s short position, on the
other hand, as a matter of public record, is patently not in dispute, nor had he given Callan any
indication that he would refrain from making further remarks in the future. In fact, during their
exchange, he twice stresses his inclination to give Callan every opportunity to clarify Lehman’s
position and, furthermore, appears willing to change his view given new information, noting,
“This is not a final decision.” Callan, for her part, levels accusations of “cherry picking” before
knowing exactly what he plans to say or even seeing his presentation. This exchange and
Callan’s reaction to it makes Lehman’s explanation of the unfolding crisis abundantly clear:
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Lehman was not to blame. Their troubles, whatever they might be, were entirely due to the
misdeeds of someone else.
The executive committee was unable to fault the firm’s strategy, liquidity, or real estate
exposure for its increasingly precarious position. Committee members did not see how policies
that had worked so well before could possibly factor in their current dilemma. They instead held
that Lehman had a perception problem, fueled largely by the allegations bandied about by short
sellers like Einhorn. Lehman was a victim of market manipulation plain and simple. This outlook
is illustrated in the amount of time Callan spent directly corresponding with Einhorn, which was
inordinate for a CFO. Rather than spend time scrutinizing balance sheets or reviewing the firm’s
risk calculus, Callan devoted time to engaging a relatively obscure hedge fund manager,
including attempts at rebutting him publicly later on. Callan blamed Einhorn and opportunists
like him for circulating market rumors that disadvantaged the firm and, moreover, she was far
from alone in this view.
Appealing to SEC to Stop Einhorn’s Attacks
When it became apparent that Einhorn would not be accommodating, Callan began exploring
legal remedies to his invective. Shortly after their exchange, an opportunity rather fortuitously
presented itself in the form of an email from a “concerned client.” Callan forwarded the letter on
to Beth Rudofker, who in turn passed it to her contacts at the SEC. Several of the elements
included in Rudofker’s note are instructive. First, Lehman’s response in the Wall Street Journal
to Einhorn’s “disruptive behavior” is incongruous with the tenor of such an appeal to the SEC.
They claim that they “will not continue to refute Mr. Einhorn’s allegations,” and, yet, here they
are refuting said allegations by lodging a complaint with a regulatory agency. The executive
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committee seems manifestly unable to just disregard Einhorn, equating him with the root of their
problems. Next, the language used by the concerned client in the included attachment is
strikingly similar to the executive committee’s own rhetoric. The remark “the same occurred in
2002, 1991, and other periods of market disruption,” in particular, sounds as though it could have
been lifted directly from Lehman memoranda. The juxtaposition between “honest and quiet
investors” and “individuals of questionable integrity and motivation,” likewise, has a familiar
ring. This could be coincidental, but the disclosure that Starr’s daughter works for Lehman
Brothers introduces the possibility that similar talking points may have earlier been internally
transmitted in response to rumblings within the rank and file, which is eminently plausible, as we
will see in later chapters.
By far the most remarkable thing about this complaint to the SEC, however, is who sent it.
Though Tom Russo, Lehman’s chief legal counsel, and Bari Wolfe, the firm’s director of
regulatory affairs, are included on the email, they did not send it. The email instead comes from
Beth Rudofker, head of internal audit. This ought to be a puzzling turn. As Lehman was
preparing to announce a nearly $3 billion quarterly loss, their principal internal auditor was not
poring over financial statements or reevaluating operational controls, but had been enlisted in a
glorified witch-hunt by the Chief Financial Officer. Of course, as it turns out, this is not quite as
puzzling as it ought to be. Those on the executive committee were not concerned by the firm’s
risk calculus and attendant lack of liquidity, having convinced themselves that they had been in
similar situations before. The only difference this time around was David Einhorn and the legion
of short sellers eroding confidence in the firm, who had to be stopped. Notwithstanding the
executive committee’s attitude concerning who was at fault for their faltering fortunes, there
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persists the question of why the preceding grievance was not brought to the attention of the SEC
by Russo or Wolfe, both of whom are included on the email and, as lawyers, were ostensibly
better situated to do so. Yet, the choice of Rudofker as messenger was not without reason. She
had had an ongoing relationship and almost daily interactions with the SEC investigators since
they had taken up residence inside Lehman’s own offices shortly after the collapse of Bear
Stearns some three months prior. Ironically enough, they had been tasked with inspecting
Lehman’s financial records for exactly the kind of underhanded financial engineering Einhorn
had been alleging.
Figure 17. Email to the SEC
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The executive committee’s preoccupation with Einhorn stemmed from their conviction
that the ship was not sinking, but rather was under attack. They judged their course of action to
be dispassionate and deliberate, and more importantly it had worked before. The only
complication that stood to frustrate their strategy was the market manipulation brought on by
unscrupulous short sellers. Still, with the enormous talents of their employees behind them,
Lehman executives were convinced that this latest challenge was just the next difficulty they
were already poised to overcome. An earlier email exchange between Fuld and Goldfard in the
midst of similar negative rumors encapsulates this attitude.
Figure 18. “Will and skill always win”
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Members of the executive committee had no illusions about the difficulties confronting
them. Negotiating the existing market turmoil would not be easy. It would take hard work and an
all-hands-on-deck approach, but “the Bros always wins.” Their outlook was such that instability
corresponded with opportunity, and they planned to reap windfalls on this occasion, as they had
several times before. The talent and tenacity of those at Lehman, they thought, would allow them
to exploit the developing financial crisis to their considerable advantage. Lehman had time and
again proven its exceptional prowess in navigating just these types of events. This time would be
no different. “Will and skill always win” and would once more carry the day.

CHAPTER THREE
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT
Lehman’s middle management occupied a very different place within the firm’s organizational
structure. They were excluded from executive committee meetings and were rarely, if ever,
asked to attend presentations before the Board of Directors. Though they shared the executives’
optimistic outlook on the prospects of the firm in turbulent times, middle management was less
concerned that outsiders would see weaknesses in Lehman Brothers, and more concerned that
Lehman executives act in order to secure the continued prosperity of the firm and its employees.
In fact, middle management had long sought to alter the firm’s capital structure by issuing more
equity. In August 2008, they may not have been keen on a prospective deal with Korea
Development Bank specifically, but at least it seemed as if leadership was taking actionable steps
toward raising capital.
By June 2008, Eric Felder had already begun marshaling his team’s talents toward
tangible action. Felder, a senior manager in Lehman’s Fixed Income Division, recognizes that
Lehman’s second quarter earnings report will be damaging and instructs his team to use an
internal company chat room to align their trading levels in advance of the announcement. In fact,
a week later Lehman would report a massive loss, its first quarterly loss since going public in
1994. The firm’s treasurer, Paolo Tonucci, is included on the chat room invitation probably
because Felder was hoping to garner support among the executive committee and suspected that
Tonucci would be the member most sympathetic to his proposal. At first, Tonucci voices
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optimism at reports “that things going well,” as a possible deal with Korea Development Bank
was beginning to materialize. However, the prospect of a Korea deal is not enough to placate
Felder, who wants to have a “plan b” ready. Stressing that the lack of a viable backup plan is not
an option, he says, “We need to have a plan b. If we report the loss without an equity raise it will
not end well.” Tonucci reports that he is “pushing as hard as I can,” but insists, “there is a high
level of optimism that the Korea deal will work out.”
Figure 19. Felder and Tonucci
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The executive committee was hopeful that a deal with Korea Development Bank could be
negotiated on more favorable terms than they could achieve by selling shares on the open market.
In addition, most on the committee were not entirely convinced that the bank needed to issue
equity in order to raise capital. If, indeed, they did decide to issue equity, members of the
executive committee preferred the quieter approach of cultivating a single strategic partner, like
Warren Buffett or Korea Development Bank, to meet their capital needs. They expected a large
capital injection from one strategic partner would avoid tarnishing perceptions of the firm, and
securing the right partner might even elevate the bank’s reputation.
This approach did not sit well with middle management, however. They were disaffected
by the executives’ protracted search for the perfect magic bullet to the firm’s woes. They agreed
that the firm had a perception problem, but suspected that this stemmed from the bank’s leverage
ratio, which could be corrected by taking immediate and measurable action. Middle management
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felt that a solution to the crisis was not just going to happen on its own. They would need to
make it happen. So, while Lehman’s leadership conjectured about a Korean deal and fabricated a
Warren Buffett rescue, Felder directed his team to communicate and collaborate on more
actionable solutions. Felder’s team chat room was not the only time that middle management
attempted to organize its own response in the face of executive inaction, nor was it even the first.
Well before the problems in the credit market were evident Lehman’s middle managers were
organizing their own method of managing the firm’s leverage. Absent clear guidance from the
executive committee, middle management seized the initiative to implement its own risk
standards.
In May 2007, even before it was apparent that a crisis was looming, middle managers
were working together to establish risk limits. Without a clear global risk limit forthcoming from
the executive committee, Rob Redmond, a senior advisor in the firm’s Global Financial Sponsor
business, observes, “we should put some kind of a limit in place so that we can begin to manage
what should be a scarce resource.” During the heady days of the real estate boom, Lehman’s
executive committee had all but abandoned standardized risk limits. Now, rather than waiting for
the executive committee to implement some kind of risk framework, middle management begins
organizing its own risk controls. Redmond seems to recognize here that without the formal
authority of the executive committee, establishing a limit that is respected across the bank’s
many business units will require that any such limit be designed in consultation with each of the
affected groups. Otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent a manager from violating this selfimposed limit within his or her own group, as the executive committee would not enforce middle
management’s separate risk standard. Redmond suggests that those on the email meet to discuss
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adopting a new risk framework and proposes using a three billion dollar limit in the interim.
Alex Kirk, a managing director of global credit products, responds by proposing they engage the
risk management team to help them identify appropriate limits. He suggests that he and Steve
Berkenfeld, a managing director for principal investing and private equity, meet with Lehman’s
Chief Risk Officer before reconvening with those on the email and asks, “does that sound
reasonable to everyone?”
Figure 20. Middle Management Collaboration
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Functionally excluded from the executive committee’s formal decision-making process, middle
management came together to take action via informally negotiated arrangements. However, this
strategy proved far less successful when operating under the power imbalance that existed
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between middle management and the executive committee, as what “sounds reasonable” to
people is informed by where they are situated in the organization and their relationship to the
firm’s organizational structures. In the first email of the chain that follows, you will notice that
Felder is unsettled by “rumours of writedowns.” While preoccupation with market rumors was
primarily the province of executives, middle management shared their concern in a way. Those
in middle management were not unbothered by market rumors, they just happened to be far more
concerned with what to do about them. Attitudes about market rumors diverged over which
actions constituted a reasonable response.
In February 2008, Felder hopes to use this new set of rumors as an excuse to delever the
bank’s balance sheet, even referencing the troubled Bear Stearns when he predicts that if things
get much worse, “it will become very difficult for us to access the market in any significant size
on a regular basis.” Thomas Humphrey, the head of global fixed income distribution and a
member of the executive committee, acknowledges only the portion of Felder’s first email about
the rumor and not what should be done about it, citing a rank and file member of his team, Steve
Pedone, who heard “the same rumour feedback.” Lowitt, at the time the Co-chief Administrative
Officer for Finance, interjects the executive committee’s usual refrain, laying the blame for the
firm’s ongoing difficulties with rumors and “poor press.” He then adds the vague exhortation
that it is “hard hat time again,” suggesting that there is work to be done without specifying what
that work entails exactly.
Felder recognizes the opening and attempts to gently return the conversation’s focus to
the steps that should be taken to minimize the effects of the rumors and prepare for worsening
market conditions. He uses the rather ominous remark, “I think the market is going to get worse

67
for the next 3-6 months,” to shift the executives’ attention to the repercussions of inaction.
Essentially, he is begging the executives to ignore the source and content of the rumors and,
instead, concentrate on the consequences that these rumors could have on the bank’s operations.
In his view, which is representative of those across the middle management tier, the best way to
respond to these rumors is to ensure that Lehman is prepared to weather worsening market
conditions. However, Felder’s appeals to preparedness fall on deaf ears. In the very next email
Tonucci reports that PIMCO, the world’s largest mutual fund, “just called about this rumour
also.” At this point, the conversation that Felder originally intended has gone entirely off the rails.
Humphrey weighs taking a more “offensive” approach to addressing the rumors, asking, “what
can we say?” and later he proposes new messaging “targeted toward the biggest holders” of
Lehman’s debt and equity. Again, this communication would in no way alter Lehman’s capital
structure, operating plan, or ability to withstand a further downturn. Felder must, ultimately,
content himself with having Lehman’s large clients added to the list of people contacted as a part
of the new “offensive” response strategy, which might, at least, help preserve existing business.
Figure 21. Felder in the Executive Echo Chamber
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Although it may rightly appear that Felder is just screaming into the abyss, the exchange
above accentuates the differences between where the executive committee and middle
management locate Lehman’s organizational priorities. While members of the executive
committee were quite literally asking “what can we say” in response to market rumors, middle
management was far more inclined to wonder “what can we do” about them. Secure in the
knowledge that their strategy had worked before, the executive committee was generally
perception-oriented. Middle management, on the other hand, was oriented toward operational
change. Both expected Lehman to endure the existing market turmoil, but those in middle
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management anticipated this outcome would require action and internal adjustments. This
immediate difference was compounded by differences in each groups’ confidence in their own
capacity to direct change at various institutional levels. Where middle management saw the need
to realign Lehman’s internal operations with its organizational values, executives saw an
opportunity to use Lehman’s organizational values to redefine Wall Street’s institutional norms.
It was as if one group wanted to change the ship’s course, while another wanted to change the
ocean.
The Crisis Continues and the Divide Deepens.
The differences in these two outlooks became more pronounced as the crisis wore on, with both
groups becoming more desperate to dominate the narrative. The executive committee and middle
management both believed that the policies and priorities for which they advocated were the
legitimate instantiation of Lehman’s organizational principles. Consequently, they marshalled
the same organizational ideals to endorse conflicting courses of action. Felder’s more forceful
appeal to members of the committee in March 2008, about one month later, provides a clear
example of this.
While awaiting a reply from CFO Erin Callan, Felder forwards an email expressing his
concerns to executive committee member Bart McDade, the global head of Lehman’s Equities
Division, noting, “I’m not sure we are set up to weather this one.” McDade’s response signals his
objections to Felder’s petition from the very beginning, opening with a single word:
“Leadership!” He admonishes Felder to “think positive,” adding, “perpetual optimism is a force
multiplier.” McDade’s instructions to “keep plugging away!!!” encapsulate the thrust of his reply.
He is directing Felder to stick to the plan and embrace the executive committee’s leadership style
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and talking points within his own team. McDade even insinuates that Felder’s lack of resolute
leadership might be part of the problem, interposing the question “what has your credit team
conjured up in balance sheet and cash credit relief itself?”
Comparing McDade’s email to Felder’s subsequent answer illuminates how both men
could reach such wildly different conclusions when putting the same organizational beliefs into
practice. McDade and Felder share the conviction that Lehman is exceptional, bound up in an
entrenched and tested meritocracy. Yet, this sentiment manifests differently for both. After
enumerating the banks that “are already lining the equity up,” Felder contends, “We need to be at
the front of the line.” Not only does this assertion imply that Lehman should be at the front of the
line, but that it is, in fact, capable of being at the front of the line because its exceptional
management and history of success will enable it to jump in front of UBS, Fannie Mae, Merrill
Lynch, and the like. Felder wants to leverage Lehman’s reputation to delever the bank’s balance
sheet. Relatedly, McDade is so convinced of Lehman’s superiority that he is unable to entertain
any notion of how things might be done better, especially if this requires doing so “not because it
makes sense, but just because.” He rhetorically submits to Felder, “what else should we be doing
that we are not doing,” intimating that they do not need to do anything else.
Upon hitting a wall with McDade, Felder tips his hand to co-CAO Ian Lowitt in the
hopes of achieving a better result. The outcome, however, is not much different. Like both Felder
and McDade, Lowitt perceives Lehman Brothers as set above its Wall Street peers, declaring, “it
will be tough, but we are more active than others.” Moreover, he agrees with Felder that
counterparty risk will cause another bank run, but, echoing McDade, he believes that “it will be
industry-wide, not Lehman-specific.” The subtext of Lowitt’s comment, then, is that Lehman is
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better positioned to withstand a run on the financial sector than any of its industry competitors.
Still, Felder takes one more shot with the plea, “Begging that people trust me. You can fire me if
I’m wrong.” Of course, the tension between Felder and those on the executive committee is not
the product of distrust, but is rather a consequence of parallel views on how best to enact
Lehman’s guiding principles in practice.
Figure 22. Felder to Callan… and McDade… and Lowitt
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Bankruptcy: Charges of Executive Sabotage and Claims of Middle Management Innocence
Frustrations continued to mount on both sides right up to the moment of the bankruptcy, at which
point several middle managers were no longer able to contain their contempt for Lehman’s brass.
On the morning of Lehman’s bankruptcy, in September 2008, Satu Parikh, the managing director
of commodities trading, sent several emails similar to that above to the members of the executive
committee, but only ever received a response from Mike Gelband, Lehman’s global head of
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capital markets. Parikh’s missive is remarkable for its candor, though it was by no means unique.
His indignation is palpable through the first paragraph, but it is not until the second that he
clearly ascribes blame to the executive committee. In a way, the charge, “I think there needs to
be an investigation into the broader issue of malfeasance,” is analogous to the executive
committee’s judgment that Lehman itself cannot possibly be at fault. However, unlike the
executive committee, which only identifies market rumors and short sellers as the culprit, middle
management expands the list of those culpable for Lehman’s misfortunes to include the
executive committee itself. Due to their faith in Lehman’s proven investment strategy and the
exceptional talents of employees, the only plausible way for middle managers to account for
Lehman’s failure is gross malfeasance at the top. Lehman’s internally esteemed exceptionalism
precludes any inclination by either group that the firm’s practices or investment philosophy
could be at fault. Both groups see their own actions and decisions as beyond reproach. For
middle managers, who had been excluded from the committee’s formal decision-making process,
this evoked an “us versus them” mentality, which Parikh articulates in the line, “We were NOT
in this together.” For his part, Gelband apologizes without acknowledging any responsibility for
the firm’s fading fortunes. In fact, his response only serves to reinforce Parikh’s narrative with
the added nuance that not all executives are at fault. The claim, “I tried my best both before I got
fired and during the 10 weeks I’ve been back,” leaves room to question whether those who fired
him also tried their best.
Parikh also calls attention to the physical distance that separated middle management
from those on the executive committee, declaring, “You guys on [the thirty-first floor]
monumentally screwed this one up.” In this way, Parikh uses the physical arrangement of
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Lehman’s office space to reflect what he sees as the ideological distance separating the two
groups. While these groups certainly differed in their orientation to the firm’s organizational
priorities, the major themes pervading Lehman’s organizational culture were ubiquitous across
the layers of the company hierarchy. However, Parikh’s use of Lehman’s floor plan to enforce an
“us versus them” outlook enables him and others to preserve a portrait of middle management as
blameless.
Figure 23. “You guys on 31 monumentally screwed this one up.”
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In order for middle management to escape responsibility, someone else must be at fault.
Displacing blame onto a small cadre of top executives allows middle management to maintain a
view of themselves as blameless and, thus, unblemished by Lehman’s failure. This is important
because by avoiding blame, middle managers can continue to lay claim to exceptional talents
despite Lehman’s collapse. This persists after the bankruptcy, as illustrated below in an appeal
from Kaushik Amin, the managing director of liquid markets. Amin, a middle manager, worries
that employees, like himself, will not show up for work after the bankruptcy court halts their
paychecks. Simply put, the tenor of his note is that you have to pay for talent. He is unable to
recognize that by now the jig is up. Lehman has entered bankruptcy and employees, regardless of
their talents and skills, are not entitled to a paycheck from a bankrupt company. Still he persists
because middle managers did not see themselves at fault for Lehman’s undoing. They identified
Lehman’s failure with failures at the executive level and, as such, those in middle management
did not believe that the firm’s collapse impeached their own exceptional skill sets in any way.
This outlook is reflected by Amin from the outset, who beginnings by insisting, “The financial
system is very complex and requires specialized skills.” He continues by drawing a clear
distinction between the “sophisticated” labor of Lehman employees and the blue-collar labor
involved in pulling physical stock in a warehouse. He claims that even those with the requisite
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financial training will be unable to unwind Lehman’s balance sheet in an orderly fashion,
proclaiming, “Outside personnel cannot do this task in a short period of time.” Irrespective of the
rationale, Amin is grasping for what amounts to a consolation prize. However, it is a consolation
prize that he and other middle managers appear to feel entitled to due to what they see as their
place among Wall Street’s elite minds. Recall Parikh’s email above, in which he claims that top
executives “will carry that with them in all future endeavors.” It is difficult to see how those in
middle management could possibly escape being similarly marked by this failure, as they were
all involved in Lehman’s day-to-day operations. It is as though they believe their exclusion from
the executive committee’s decision-making process insulates them from bearing any
responsibility for the firm’s fate. So much so, in fact, that even after Lehman has gone bankrupt
Amin writes an email extolling the merits of continuing to pay these employees while the
bankruptcy is adjudicated.
Figure 24. Amin on what will happen if employees do not show up for work
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Middle managers located a mandate to act in Lehman’s organizational values and when it
became clear that executive leadership would not implement the operational changes that middle
managers thought the company’s cultural tenets demanded, they collaborated together to design
and implement their own informal solutions. They centered action toward operational change in
their own negotiated decision-making process, but struggled against the power imbalance that
came with being excluded from executive committee decision making. Yet, it was this exclusion
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from the nexus of formal decision-making authority that allowed middle management to cling to
a belief in their own talents in spite of failure. Neither the executive committee nor middle
management thought the ship was sinking, but where those on the executive committee saw a
ship under attack, middle managers saw the ship being sabotaged. After the bankruptcy, blaming
leadership became more pronounced among the ranks of middle managers and they made their
feelings clear that they had not contributed to the decline and, ultimately, the demise of the
company in any way. They still believed themselves to be exceptional and ensconced in Wall
Street’s financial elite. Middle management demanded that only the captain go down with the
ship.

CHAPTER FOUR
JUNIOR EMPLOYEES
Relative to the sheer glut of emails authored by middle management and those on the executive
committee, the data contain comparatively few examples of substantive correspondence between
rank and file employees. More often than not, rank and file employees appear on emails as
observers, simply copied to emails in which middle managers relate instructions to be carried out
by their lower level direct reports. Instances when these lower level employees actually engage
in meaningful exchanges with one another or their supervisors often occur with little internal
context provided. It is entirely possible that the dearth of internal context present in exchanges
between rank and file employees is because they were careful about what they would commit to
writing. As such, much of the data from rank and file employees had to be contextualized by
recreating the timeline of events along which they occur and situating these exchanges within the
fluid relationship dynamics outlined by the rest of the data in order to uncover how the
organizational location of junior staff shaped their interactions. Notwithstanding this challenge,
the data present a clear and more or less cohesive picture of junior employees at Lehman
Brothers during this period.
The picture of Lehman’s rank and file that emerges from the data is anything but a
collection of compliant subordinates content to unquestioningly carry out orders behind the
scenes. Junior employees were self-confident and quietly critical and on occasion even jocular
when discussing Lehman’s plight with peers. Like the executives and middle managers
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considered above, rank and file employees imagined that those at Lehman Brothers were capable
of overcoming any obstacle. They found comfort in the abiding wisdom that Lehman had
weathered worse and now possessed an unparalleled mastery of the financial markets, a legacy
of excellence to which they also laid claim by virtue of having earned a place within the
company’s ranks. Junior employees upheld Lehman’s cultural tenets and put their faith in their
own exceptional skills to see them through. However, this had a different operative meaning for
them in practice. The rank and file, especially toward the end, were less concerned with the fate
of the firm or the value of their Lehman stock, as many did not own any. They were concerned
with what would happen to them and they were confident that they would quickly find
employment elsewhere. Like passengers on a sinking ship, Lehman’s junior employees believed
it was just a matter of time until another ship came along to rescue them.
Following the bankruptcy, Lehman’s lower tier employees knew that there would be no
golden parachutes for them, but they were equally convinced that they would not be stained by
the firm’s failure. They expected to escape the crisis with their own reputations and, more
importantly, their résumés intact. In fact, the data capture more middle managers successfully
exiting the firm in the lead up to the bankruptcy than rank and file employees even attempting to
leave. This is not to say that junior employees shared their superiors’ optimism, especially as
bankruptcy became more and more imminent. Indeed, the rank and file joked openly with each
other about what they saw as maladroit attempts by executives to stave off bankruptcy. Junior
employees believed that Lehman’s failure was a failure of management and did not reflect the
true caliber of the rank and file. Lehman’s present shortcomings, whatever they might be,
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certainly could not be attributed to them, though they were eager to identify with Lehman’s past
success.
At the same time, the data reveal an executive committee struggling to control the
narrative and concerned that mounting criticism in the press might trigger a mass exodus among
the rank and file, neutering the bank’s ability to both respond and carry on normal operations. In
the independent, but related, emails that follow, Catherine Jones, the global head of
communications, circulates a Wall Street Journal article referencing an anonymous external
email entitled “Breaking News: Lehman To Be Acquired by Tooth Fairy,” (see Appendix B for
the full text) much to the amusement of junior employees. A short time later Larry Wieseneck,
co-head of securities, betrays the executive committee’s pressing concern for the attitudes of the
rank and file, when what was supposed to be a confidential communication with the rating
agency Moody’s somehow finds its way into the company rumor mill.
It is not altogether clear why Jones distributes this article across the firm. There was
speculation within Lehman Brothers that David Einhorn was the referenced email’s author or, at
least, was in some way behind it and, in fact, the missive even mentions him approvingly,
describing him facetiously as “mean, evil, bad short-seller David Einhorn.” Therefore, it is
possible that Jones circulates the piece hoping to get out in front of the story, or even as an
attempt to stoke resentment of Einhorn within the firm’s rank and file. In any event, the
lighthearted reaction she elicits from Peter Keavey, a senior vice president in the fixed income
division, would not have been her aim.
Several weeks later, Larry Wieseneck divulges the executive committee’s genuine
concern about the clamoring of those on the lower floors. His email begins with a recounting of a
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recent conversation with Moody’s analysts in which he was involved. By this point, Lehman had
already suffered one Moody’s downgrade, yet Wieseneck exhibits little concern about the
prospect of another or even what should be the more startling revelation that “there is no amount
of capital we could raise in the markets that would make them comfortable.” Instead, he reserves
his concern for the reactions of junior employees on floors two through five, where “people are
asking questions.” Confronted with a rating agency’s grave doubts regarding the continued
viability of an independent Lehman Brothers, doubts that invoke the ill-fated Bear Stearns no
less, Wieseneck seems more troubled that somehow this news “is now all over the 4th floor.”
Figure 25. “Lehman To Be Acquired by Tooth Fairy”
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What Lehman’s leadership failed to realize was that the rank and file simply did not see
their fate tied to that of Lehman Brothers in quite the same way. What is more, this was nothing
new and had, by and large, been the case for at least a year. Toward the end of 2007, after
Lehman’s ballooning balance sheet had exposed the potential dangers of the firm’s Repo 105
accounting practice, a junior employee and his middle management supervisor exploit their
mutual recognition of the potential hazards that this poses to share a moment of levity with one
another.
Repo 105 is an accounting maneuver, whereby a short-term over-collateralized
repurchase agreement is classified as a constructive sale. Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to
make it appear as though they had less debt than they actually did when it came time for them to
publicly report earnings. The process would begin with Lehman identifying another financial
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firm that had excess cash reserves to lend out. This other financial firm is termed the
“counterparty.” Lehman would then “sell” assets, generally government bonds, to the
counterparty in exchange for their cash value. At the same time, Lehman would agree to
repurchase these same assets from the counterparty soon after, usually only a day or two, at
105% of their cash value, hence the name Repo 105. In the interim, Lehman would use the cash
from the “sale” to pay down its debt right before publicly releasing its required financial
disclosures. Once its disclosures were published, Lehman would resume its debt and repurchase
its assets from the counterparty at the 105% premium. In reality, the assets “sold” rarely changed
hands because the period between the sale and buy-back was so short, but the well-timed process
allowed Lehman Brothers to temporarily conceal sizable losses from its balance sheet. This was
all legal.
Repeated use of Repo 105 as a balance sheet cosmetic comes with tremendous risks, not
the least of which is the need to regularly find counterparties willing to essentially lend out their
cash reserves. The need for additional counterparties precipitates the exchange below, as, having
already recorded $10.5 billion of Repo 105 agreements, Mitchell King, the managing director of
rates trading, reports that he is still trying to “get another 700 million out.” Management’s
continued reliance on Repo 105 to superficially strengthen the firm’s balance sheet around
reporting time was a mark of hubris and, indeed, Lehman was the only major firm employing
this gimmick during the Financial Crisis. Neither tier of management could even fathom the
possibility of prospective counterparties disappearing. It was utterly unthinkable that companies
would not jump at the chance to lend to the mighty Lehman, which might explain why, when
asked “Can you imagine what this would be like without 105?” King responds by joking, “it
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would be even more worser.” Unfazed, Jerry Rizzieri, a vice president and senior banker among
the rank and file in the firm’s fixed income division, joins in the joke, adding, “In fact, it might
even be the most worstest.”
The reasons behind Rizzieri’s flippancy, however, are different. He does not appear
apathetic about the chances of Repo 105 counterparties suddenly retreating. Recall that before
his supervisor responds comically, Rizzieri earnestly calls attention to the prospective peril of
being forced to perform their work “without 105.” Still, he is comfortable enough to joke about
the dangers posed. Like other members of the rank and file, Rizzieri likely had faith in the
judgment and skill of his superiors and even if, in the end, things turned out poorly, his time at
Lehman would serve as valuable experience. Unlike the company men higher up, who “bled
Lehman green” and could not imagine a world without Lehman Brothers, junior employees did
not define themselves through their commitment to the corporate entity that was Lehman.
Figure 26. King and Rizzieri talk Repo 105
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Even though rank and file employees did not outwardly share the same allegiance as their
organizational superiors to the material trappings of the corporation, their identity was,
nevertheless, tied up in the cultural understandings of Lehman Brothers. Lehman’s
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organizational culture had meaning for the rank and file beyond the bounds of the bank’s four
walls. They would always be “Lehman investment bankers.” They just might not always be
investment bankers at Lehman Brothers.
This became abundantly clear after the bankruptcy, as junior employees continued with
“business as usual,” confident that they would not be blamed for the firm’s misfortunes and so
allowed to keep their jobs even as the bankruptcy court prepared to sell off Lehman’s business
units piecemeal. In the exchange below, Paul Gregg, a vice president of global commodities
trading, asks his peer Peter Keavey, a senior vice president, if he has heard anything about the
rumors that Barclays Capital (“Barcap”) plans to acquire Lehman’s investment banking business
out of bankruptcy. Imparting that both he and Keavey would be included in the rumored deal, he
says, “the Barcap thing looked good.”
Gregg’s parenthetical addition, “that’s us,” is almost assuredly unnecessary. Peter
Keavey knows where he works. Its inclusion serves only to convey a near childlike giddiness
that prevailing rumors hold that their jobs are out of jeopardy. This singular remark encapsulates
Gregg’s trepidation about what will happen next as well as his conviction that the outcome will
be favorable for them whatever the case. It is also worth noting that this exchange takes place
just one day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, so Keavey’s “diplomatic reply,” “Is
there anything to tell?” is remarkably suitable. The notion that anything substantive had been
decided so soon, much less which, if any, junior employees would be retained, should have been
implausible. Yet, Gregg reports, “the Barcap thing looked good.” And while it may have looked
good for lower level employees, like Keavey and Gregg, for Lehman Brothers things could not
have looked bleaker the day after its bankruptcy.
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Figure 27. Gregg and Keavey the day after the bankruptcy
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As time passed following the bankruptcy, junior employees increasingly
compartmentalized the business entity Lehman Brothers and the culture of Lehman. Even after
the firm failed, their own self-confidence endured. They divorced the firm’s fate from the firm’s
culture and continued to embody the resilience, excellence, and exceptionalism that they felt
existed at Lehman. This explains why, even after the firm failed, the cultural outlook of former
employees in the rank and file persisted unchanged.
John Palchynsky, a junior employee in the collateral allocation group, reports JPMorgan
Chase is pilfering Lehman’s Depository Trust account through the extrajudicial reallocation of
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Lehman’s pledged collateral securities from a custodial account into Chase’s own corporate
account. Lehman Brothers’ Treasurer, Paolo Tonucci, responds by asking, “Why are they doing
this?” A mere thirteen minutes later Palchynsky essentially replies, “I don’t know.” Rather than
find a more definitive answer to an executive committee member’s question, Palchynsky offers
his best guess and then follows it up with, “see you all at Barcap.” JPMorgan surreptitiously
looting Lehman’s collateral is a problem for Lehman Brothers, not Barclays, and Palchynsky,
who seemed to already be thinking of himself as a Barclays employee, simply could not be
bothered with this problem. Yet, Palchynsky’s perspective is recklessly early, as Barclays would
not finalize the deal to acquire the remnants of Lehman Brothers until three days later on
September 22nd. Barclays had, by this point, confirmed many of the rumors and announced its
interest in acquiring Lehman’s investment operation. However, any deal would still need to
receive all kinds of approval from both sides of the Atlantic, including approval from the U.S.
Federal Reserve, the British Financial Services Authority, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a
bankruptcy court judge. On September 19th this remained far from a done deal. Nevertheless,
Palchynsky is convinced he will soon be a Barclays employee. Even after Lehman’s failure, he
remains confident that his skill set will be enough to save him and his career, just as the
exceptional skills of employees had saved Lehman in the past. He comments, “It has been one
hell of a week, challenging, but exhilarating too,” suggesting that the work of dealing with the
firm’s demise is both exacting and rewarding.
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Figure 28. Palchynsky ready to move on
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It is as if Palchynsky sees the bankruptcy as an opportunity to ply his skills and a chance
to accumulate valuable experience. In so doing, he ignores the exigencies of his present
circumstances in favor of imagining the more pleasant potentialities that he believes his

94
professional qualities will eventually occasion. Thus, he assumes he will shortly become a
Barcap employee, but only because he continues to think like a Lehman employee.
The data contain only a single example of a rank and file employee attempting to leave
Lehman Brothers before the bankruptcy. Taken together, the emails below are instructive as a
negative case depicting a junior employee deciding to abandon the firm. James Macintosh, a vice
president of carbon trading, asks his middle management supervisor Max Coreth, a managing
director of commodities trading, if he can spend the second week of September (i.e. 9/8-9/12)
visiting the coal team in Denver and attend a trade group conference there. While the data do not
contain Coreth’s response, the second email establishes Macintosh’s true motivation for making
the trip to Denver. In the second email, sent the Monday morning following his trip (i.e. 9/15),
Macintosh reconnects with Robert Forgrave, the global head of commodities for rival investment
bank CIBC, to solicit employment with Lehman’s competitor. The aide-memoire “we met this
past winter to discuss potential carbon trading roles at CIBC World Markets” reveals that
Macintosh’s trip to Denver was not only a premeditated attempt to leave Lehman Brothers, but
also that it was not his first. Macintosh later explains his desire to leave Lehman, noting, “Now
that I am (very likely) on the market I wanted to reconnect.” It is not clear from either exchange
when exactly Macintosh lost his faith in Lehman Brothers, but his emails leave little doubt that
he did not share his peers’ attitude that rank and file employees could just wait around to be
saved from the crisis.
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Figure 29. Macintosh prepares to abandon ship
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This negative case reflects many of the fundamental differences central to the hierarchical
divisions at Lehman Brothers. Middle management operationalized Lehman’s values by
pursuing concrete action to the extent they were able, while those on the executive committee
unflinchingly adhered to strategies that had proven successful in the past for the very same
reason. Where middle managers saw executive inaction or operational negligence, executives
saw strategic and steadfast resolve. Where executives saw panicking middle managers
overreacting, middle management saw sensible measures and overdue changes. Both used the
same cultural tenets to justify their conflicting approaches. The negative case above appears to
be a microcosm of this same conflict within the rank and file. Most junior employees believe that,
like passengers on a sinking ship, it is only a matter of time until they are rescued. They expect
other investment banks to recognize that their skills and experience are far too valuable to be lost
when Lehman fails, so they are content to wait for the next opportunity to come along. On the
other hand, though Macintosh likewise believes his skills are highly prized, recounting as much
in his email to Forgrave, he goes searching for a lifeboat. Like the middle managers, who
discovered in Lehman’s organizational principles an injunction to act to save the firm, Macintosh
concludes that it is incumbent upon him to act to save himself, as he proactively ventures to
abandon ship.
Importantly, both Macintosh’s decision to attempt to leave and others’ decision to
patiently remain, just like the larger managerial decisions toward inaction or change, were
agentive and contemplative. While these actions were informed by the structure of organizational
hierarchies and institutional histories, there were undertaken by people interacting with one
another to situate the meanings of events within shifting organizational contingencies during a
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period of crisis. Decisions made throughout Lehman Brothers represent different instantiations of
the same cultural principles. Each decision, exchange, and interaction is illustrative of differently
positioned groups enacting the same organizational culture toward different organizational
priorities based on the exigencies apparent at different organizational locations. As such,
Lehman’s organizational crisis did not lead to cultural disintegration, but rather engendered a
shared cultural zeal, which complicated decision making when different groups used it to justify
competing courses of action.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The failure of Lehman Brothers is a compelling case of cultural survival despite
organizational demise because it is an instance of complete organizational collapse that
nevertheless accommodates social scientific inquiry by preserving a record of employee
interactions. Though the permanent failure of the organization renders traditional ethnographic
methods unavailable, Lehman’s email records remain preserved as cultural artifacts. These
records of employee interaction enable the organization’s history, practices, and negotiated order
to be recreated and observed. The foregoing chapters piece together surviving email exchanges
to provide a picture of Lehman Brothers during its final months and demonstrate how employees
across the organization’s hierarchy sustained and amplified Lehman’s organizational culture in
different ways as the crisis deepened.
The company’s organizational culture was grounded in the extra-local free market logics
concerning meritocracy, the significance of talent, and the virtues of competition that are
institutionalized in the American financial sector more broadly. Institutionalized assumptions
about talent and competition were ensconced in executive committee accounts of the firm’s prior
triumphs. Executives located these institutional logics in every one of Lehman’s previous
successes, crediting the firm’s counter-cyclical growth strategy with the company’s rapid
expansion during the decade before the bankruptcy. The counter-cyclical growth strategy itself
was an expression of the perceived talent and expertise embodied by Lehman executives. They
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believed that they had devised a way to repeatedly outsmart and outcompete Wall Street’s other
investment banks and pointed to the gifted workforce who concocted and skillfully executed this
strategy to explain their enormous and sustained success. They held out their experiences during
the dot-com bubble and Russian Financial Crisis as proof of this. When members of the
executive committee proclaim, “Will and skill always win,” or demand, “No blinking,” they are
instantiating the institutional logics of talent and competition that are bound up in the firm’s
counter-cyclical growth strategy to justify organizational inaction and avoid the past
overreactions of their competitors by simply “staying the course.”
Middle management’s desire to issue new equity hinged on the same institutionalized
assumptions about talent and competition. Unlike executive committee members, however, they
did not believe that success through counter-cyclical growth was self-actualizing or could be
achieved through inaction. While they were resolved that they possessed “very specialized
skills” that enabled them “to understand sophisticated financial systems,” this amounted to
naught if the executive committee hindered their ability to exercise these talents and take
advantage of their competitive edge. This plays out most clearly, perhaps, when Felder argues,
“Lehman needs to be at the front of the line [to raise fresh equity].” Felder, as well as the
executives with whom he corresponds, maintains that Lehman’s history of success makes it the
best bank on the Street. They are all convinced that Lehman is superior to UBS, Washington
Mutual, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch, etc. As such, they do not anticipate
encountering any difficulty cutting in front of their competitors in the line to raise equity. The
executives, however, do not believe there is a need to race against inferior banks, while Felder is
of the opinion that the ability to outcompete others does not matter if you refuse to participate in
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the competition altogether. After the bankruptcy, middle management expresses resentment over
being hamstrung in their attempts to save the bank by the executive committee. They feel the
firm’s executives had betrayed the meritocracy on which Lehman was built, ultimately declaring
that they “were NOT in this together.”
Rank and file employees were able to disentangle their personal identities from the
failure of Lehman Brothers more quickly and completely than either of the groups above them.
Though Lehman’s junior employees were far less concerned with the fate of the firm than their
organizational superiors, they turned to the same institutional logics when constructing their
place in the labor market both before and after the bankruptcy. Rather than use prevailing ideas
about talent and competition to decipher what Lehman should do to address its woes, junior
employees adapted these assumptions to inform their own personal responses to the crisis.
Members of the rank and file were engrossed in unraveling how the logics of competition would
manifest in the labor market and affect their employment prospects. At the same time, however,
they were convinced that they had, at least individually, been “successful at Lehman” and
“possessed expertise” that would be recognized and valued by other prospective employers.
They upheld Lehman’s shared culture of exceptionalism and anticipated that time spent at
Lehman Brothers would serve as sufficient signal of their talents and mastery of financial
skillsets by virtue of simply having secured such prestigious employment with what was once a
well-regarded Wall Street titan.
Throughout the course of Lehman’s downfall, its organizational culture galvanized
different hierarchical groups to condemn the perceived faults and flawed decisions of other
groups, both internal and external, while enabling each of these groups to avoid accepting any of
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the blame themselves. Importantly, however, each group was consistently oriented to the
collective problem of Lehman’s deteriorating financial position and embraced the same
institutional logics in their proposals for addressing the crisis. Disagreements seldom arose when
determining “what do these logics mean,” but instead emerged as disputes over “what do these
logics mean we should do.” We can now revisit the organizational failure typology introduced in
Chapter One.
Previous studies of organizational failure demonstrate how organizations can fail, in
whole or in part, and outline the relationship between organizational failure and the failure of
organizational cultures. Reviewing what can happen to an organization’s culture under instances
of temporary and total organizational failures foregrounds the virtues of these classifications and
clarifies this study’s contribution to the organization studies literature. Standard business school
case studies, like Kotter and Heskett’s (1992) classic evaluation of Nissan, envision a top-down
leadership-driven sort of culture change in which management identifies operational deficiencies
and implements new norms of conduct and ways of thinking to overcome the challenge.
Occasionally, however, organizational crises bring about group role disintegration and complete
cultural collapse, as in the case of the Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993), while in other instances
organizational crises inflame cultural schisms that reveal or precipitate multiple idiocultures, as
in the case of the Plainfield Tornado (Fine and Hallett 2014) or Arthur Andersen (Hallett 2003).
Vaughan (1996) even demonstrates how an organizational culture can endure a momentary,
albeit tragic, organizational failure, leaving the organization vulnerable to similar occurrences.
However, little attention has been directed toward understanding how organizational culture can
survive the complete and total failure of an organization. This study, quite literally, fills this gap
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Figure 30. Organizational Failures and Organizational Cultural Outcomes Revisited
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operational problems.
(see Kotter and Heskett 1992)
Crisis causes or reveals generative
Cultural
dissonance between groups and the
disintegration organization fractures into factions
into idiocultures differentiated by idiocultures, but
survives despite these divisions

Cultural
survival

Total organizational failure and
organization dissolution
Collapse of sensemaking;
Group disintegration;
Breakdown of people doing things
together
Complete cultural disintegration
Mann Gulch Fire (Weick 1993)
Discrete groups characterized by
distinct idiocultures compete for
organizational control; No single
group is able to overcome crisis on
its own

Existing culture splinters into
multiple idiocultures

Existing culture splinters as
organization collapses

Plainfield Tornado (Fine and
Hallett 2014)
Organizational crisis attributed to
“operator error” or “isolated
misconduct”;
Leaders blamed, fired, and
replaced; High risk of recurrence

Arthur Andersen Collapse
(Hallett 2003)
Culture is a source of both group
cohesion and confusion during
organizational crisis; “Group
think” intensifies cultural zeal as
the organization implodes; Staff
preserve existing meanings

Challenger Launch Disaster
(Vaughan 1996)

Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy

in the literature and completes the typology in Figure 30 by demonstrating that though Lehman
employees disagreed about how to solve the organization’s problems, they remained similarly
oriented to the crisis. Lehman’s organizational culture served as a source of cohesion that
provided employees with a common frame of reference for understanding the crisis, but also
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provoked confusion as conflicts, driven by employees’ different organizational positions,
emerged over how best to respond.
Despite the organization’s failure, Lehman Brothers’ culture never waned. It did not
deteriorate or disintegrate, nor did it fracture into rival idiocultures with competing meanings
systems and paradigms. Each of the company’s hierarchical groups developed slightly different
proposals for dealing with the crisis and leveraged their recommendations to ascribe blame to
other groups after the organization ultimately collapsed, but each of these proposals rested on the
same shared cultural orientation. None of the hierarchical groups ever abandoned the core tenets
of meritocracy and exceptionalism. They simply manifested them in different ways and
mobilized them toward distinct organizational priorities. Each group felt as though they had done
exactly what they were supposed to do and so were unable to entertain the notion that they might
have acted any differently. Even after the organization’s failure, the organization’s culture
endured, which, perhaps, not only demonstrates the durability of Lehman’s culture, but also the
durability of the privilege of elite groups. Former Lehman Brothers employees fully expected
and, indeed, felt entitled to retain the social status and economic privilege they felt their talents
merited and, in fact, most all of them did.
Jerry Rizzieri was made a managing director when Barclays acquired Lehman out of
bankruptcy and since 2016 he has been head of Mizuho Securities, the U.S. investment-banking
subsidiary of Japan-based Mizuho Financial Group. Paul Gregg was recently named Chief
Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Rock Elm Capital, a private equity firm in
Connecticut. Peter Keavey is the Director of Crude and Refined Energy Products for the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME Group), where he is responsible for risk management and ensuring
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stability in the oil and gas markets. John Palchynsky did, indeed, end up at Barclays Capital, just
as he predicted, and James Macintosh followed his supervisor, Max Coreth, into the energy
sector, where they work for Sempra Energy.
Lehman’s former middle managers fared equally well. Kaushik Amin, who argued, “The
financial system is very complex and requires specialized skills,” was rewarded for his own
specialized skills when he was tapped to head Royal Bank Scotland’s (RBS) commodities
division shortly after the bankruptcy. In the May 2009 press release announcing Amin’s hiring,
RBS CFO Mark Snell declared, “Kaushik’s experience running international businesses in varied
market conditions will contribute greatly to the continued success of the firm. We look forward
to him joining our management team.”1 Amin’s time at Lehman Brothers during the firm’s
failure, rather than being a liability, appears to have been among the primary reasons for his
hiring. Satu Parikh, who confronted members of the executive committee via email on the
morning of the bankruptcy, was also hired by RBS before moving on to Harvard Management
Company to serve as the Natural Resources portfolio manager for the university’s endowment
fund. Ken Umezaki, the author of the first email shared in this paper, now works for a digital
music streaming company, of which he is a chief investor.
Even Lehman’s executives, who were the most visible during the firm’s downfall, have
been successful since the bankruptcy. Barclays Capital paid former Lehman CFO Ian Lowitt a
$4.5 million retention bonus for assisting with the post-bankruptcy merger. Barclays also hired
Paolo Tonucci. JPMorgan Chase quickly snatched up Beth Rudofker, citing her well-established
relationships with federal regulators. Following the bankruptcy, Ed Grieb left the financial sector
and now works for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre on Long Island. Thomas
1
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Humphrey joined the hedge fund GoldenTree, which “manages alternative and non-traditional
asset strategies for sophisticated institutional investors with high risk appetites” (i.e. shortselling). Bart McDade founded the hedge fund River Birch Capital, which subsequently failed in
December 2018 just over ten years after Lehman’s failure. Erin Callan retired at age 45 and lives
in The Hamptons.
As for Eric Felder, he was finally appointed to Lehman’s executive committee on
September 7th, 2008, barely a week before the bankruptcy. After acquiring Lehman Brothers,
Barclays finalized a $41 million retention deal with Felder to ensure he would stay.
It seems CEO Dick Fuld is the only former Lehman executive to struggle to find
employment following the firm’s collapse. Since the bankruptcy, Fuld has bounced from project
to project, unable to escape bearing the responsibility for Lehman’s failure. Like Nissan’s former
CEO, Takashi Ishihara, and the Space Shuttle Challenger project managers, Larry Mulloy and
Stanley Reinartz, Fuld was sacrificed to the politics of blame. Wall Street and the public at large
needed a villain. Congress wanted to know who was responsible. Fuld became the scapegoat: the
captain of the sunken ship and the face of Lehman’s failure. Fuld, like NASA’s project managers
and Nissan’s Ishihara, was unable to shake the negative associations that came with being the
figurehead of a failed organization.
Employees at all levels of Lehman Brothers creatively enacted local manifestations of the
institutional logics that structure the wider field of American finance. Therefore, their decisionmaking processes, interactions, and practices, while distinct to Lehman Brothers, were at least
somewhat familiar to those in other organizations. This is likely the reason that so many of them
quickly found similar employment with other organizations in the field despite the failure of
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Lehman Brothers as an organization. Yet, the other organizations that occupy that field still
needed to explain what happened to Lehman Brothers before they could move forward with
business as usual. In Dick Fuld, they found their explanation. Locating the immediate cause of
Lehman’s failure in a single powerful decision maker made the remedy easily apparent. The
individual responsible had to be fired, reassigned, forced into retirement, or, in Fuld’s case,
ostracized. It seems the industry attached to Fuld all of the faults contributing to the
organization’s final negative outcome.
Whether or not Fuld, or anyone else, could have taken action to prevent the
organization’s failure is not particularly pertinent here precisely because Lehman’s bankruptcy
was so unexpected. Unlike the downfall of the more cavalier Bear Stearns, whose employees had
earned a reputation for being Wall Street “cowboys,” Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy came as a
surprise to many, as the company had been seen as a relatively safe bet until its waning months.
As late as February 2008, executives and some senior personnel were still putting billions of
dollars of their own money into Lehman Brothers preferred shares.3 Lehman Brothers was the
only major investment bank to formally declare bankruptcy during the 2007-2008 Financial
Crisis, but its failure is only seen as exceptional in retrospect. Had Lehman failed six months
earlier, policymakers from that period suggest that the bank would have been offered the same
government-underwritten rescue that Bear Stearns received at the time.4 Had Lehman failed two
months later, it is likely that the bank would have been fully bailed out like Citigroup, which
2
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remains the sole example of bank nationalization in United States history. At the time of its
bankruptcy, Lehman was not stained by a bad reputation, so the big surprise is counterfactual.
Moreover, Lehman employees at all levels of the organizational hierarchy never considered the
bank “too big to fail.” That terminology only emerged in response to subsequent Wall Street
bailouts. In fact, employees were unable to envision the firm’s failure. They didn’t even talk
about the possibility of a Bear Stearns-like buyout. Analytically, Lehman Brothers is a case of
“absence” and that absence proves to be the crux of the case.
It seems Dick Fuld was right to observe, “the real success for Lehman Brothers in my
view, and the key differentiator, was our culture.” Yet, it was this culture that paralyzed the
organization with its unpredictability. Lehman employees could not address organizational
contingencies that they were unable to acknowledge existed. Employees at all levels and
locations of the organization were ensnarled in the contentious and, at times, confounding
cultural work of defining the appropriate course of action as the crisis developed, often over the
vocal objections and disagreement of those at other levels and locations. Lehman’s failure
occasioned intensified cultural zeal, as the organization itself imploded. However, even after
Lehman’s demise its culture of exceptionalism and meritocracy survived in former employees’
explanations of the failure, which they embraced, defended, and carried forward as they
dispersed to new organizational settings. With so many former Lehman Brothers employees now
scattered across different industries6, the questions to which social scientists should turn their
attention are where, how, and in what unexpected and adaptive ways will Lehman’s extant
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organizational culture emerge next?
The company’s organizational culture was replete with local manifestations of the extralocal free market logics concerning meritocracy, the significance of talent, and the virtues of
competition that are institutionalized in the American financial sector more broadly. The process
through which these extra-local elements became endogenous to Lehman’s organizational
culture distributed the power to act on these meanings across the organizational hierarchy. Local
instantiations of free market logics within Lehman Brothers imbued those logics with distinct
force and meaning, which Lehman’s hierarchical groups sought to harness in order to justify
particular courses of organizational action. However, the instantiation of a specific logic, or sets
of logics, by one group did not preclude the refashioning and reinterpretation of the same logic
by another.
Contrary to the claims of most business school case studies on corporate culture,
management cannot dictate culture from the top-down because culture does not “move” in just
one direction, nor does it operate the same way in all parts of an organization. Culture is at once
established and spontaneous. Executives cannot direct it because culture emerges and is
reproduced dynamically as people do things together. There was clear organizational consensus
at Lehman Brothers about which logics mattered, but not how they mattered. This led to cultural
uncertainty regarding which actions were necessary to save the bank because the power to
formulate and deploy meanings in support of particular actions was diffused throughout the
organization.
This work has shown that organizational culture is more resilient than previously thought
and is not only capable of persisting through periods of organizational crisis and turmoil, but,

110
under certain institutional circumstances, organizational culture can even survive the complete
collapse of organizations. By centering organizationally situated interactions between employees
at the meso-level, the author has demonstrated how macro-level institutional logics can serve as
both a source of cultural cohesion and a point of confusion, as employees occupying disparate
positions across an organization embrace them, combine them, challenge them, and adapt them
in different ways to meet their often conflicting needs. The power to act on meanings and,
importantly, the power to leverage meanings to legitimize action is dispersed throughout an
organization, making organizational culture more ambiguous and unpredictable than traditional
business school case studies, which envision culture as an instrument of organizational
management, can accommodate.
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Breaking News:
Lehman To Be Acquired by Tooth Fairy
The market responded with enthusiasm to reports that the Tooth Fairy has agreed to acquire
Lehman. The purchase price has not yet been determined and will be set by Dick Fuld wishing
upon a star, clicking his heels three times, and being transported back to that magical place
where Lehman still sells for over $70 per share.
In related news, Lehman has agreed to sell all of its level III capital, including CDOs, ABSs,
pet rocks, baseball cards, slightly used condoms, and credit default swaps written by MBIA
and Ambac. Lehman’s level III capital will be acquired for 150% of its face value by Tinkerbell,
who will carry it off to Neverland to be fed to a crocodile.
Lehman is financing 90% of the acquisition at an interest rate that has not been announced;
Tinkerbell’s up-front payment consists of a handful of pixie dust, three crickets, and a bullfrog.
Analyst Dick Bove estimates that the bullfrog could eventually be transformed into three
princes and a pumpkin coach. The deal gives Lehman no recourse to any of Tinkerbell’s assets
other than the Level III capital. If Tinkerbell defaults, Lehman’s successor entity will stick its
hand down the crocodile’s throat and attempt to get it to regurgitate. The firm’s historical
value-at-risk analysis shows that sticking your hand down a crocodile’s throat is completely
safe.
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson issued a statement: “I am delighted that SWFs (Sovereign
Wealth Fairies) continue to express confidence in the terrific values represented by American
financial institutions. As I have been saying since August of 2007, this shows that the crisis is
now over.”
Meanwhile, the SEC has announced an investigation of mean, evil, bad short-seller David
Einhorn. While out for a beer with a friend, Einhorn reportedly suggested that the Tooth Fairy
does not exist and that wishing upon a star is not a wholly reliable price discovery
mechanism. Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC, said, “Vicious rumors attacking the Tooth
Fairy will not be tolerated. Our entire financial system and indeed the American way of life
depend on the Tooth Fairy and wishing upon a star. How else could one value level III capital
appropriately?” The SEC is reportedly planning to set up re-education camps for short-sellers.
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